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ABSTRACT 
Spencer, Bryden. A Monte Carlo Simulation Comparing the Statistical Precision of Two 
High Stakes Teacher Evaluation Methods: A Value-added Model and a 
Composite Measure. Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University of 
Northern Colorado, 2016. 
 
Value-added models are a class of growth models used in education to assign 
responsibility for student growth to teachers or schools. For value-added models to be 
used fairly, sufficient statistical precision is necessary for accurate teacher classification. 
Previous research indicated precision below practical limits. An alternative approach has 
been explored in which value-added models are incorporated into composite measures of 
teacher quality alongside subjective indicators. The aim of the current research was to 
explore the relative precision of the two evaluative approaches using simulated data. It 
was found that the composite measure produced fewer classification errors than the 
stand-alone value-added model. The magnitude of the reduction was largest when sample 
sizes were small, when composite indicators were highly correlated, and when using 
conservative alpha levels for hypothesis testing. The magnitude of the difference shrank 
as an increasing number of aggregated evaluation cycles were incorporated into the 
evaluation, when composite indicators were poorly correlated, and when less 
conservative alpha levels were used. 
 
 
iv 
Implications for this research are mixed, but there is tentative evidence that there is a 
tradeoff between precision and resource expenditure when comparing stand-alone value-
added versus composite evaluative models.
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
 Considerations of methods for teacher evaluation and accountability are evolving 
problems in American education. Driven by a myriad of factors not limited to standards 
based education, national reform such as No Child Left Behind, and a generally negative 
view of the American education system and teachers among the public (Heitin, 2012), 
teacher accountability has become an important focus in the politics of American 
education (Cochran-Smith, Piazza, & Power, 2013; Lewis, & Young, 2013). Increasingly 
over the last few decades, teacher evaluation has shifted away from informal or 
subjective methods, such as principal observations, towards methods which rely on 
standardized student test data (Steinberg, 2015). Under No Child Left Behind, schools 
were accountable to student test scores and could be sanctioned when average test scores 
fell below expected student performance gains. 
 In recent years, test data have been used increasingly to evaluate individual 
teachers. This shift towards teacher level accountability is due various social, political 
and technical factors including a national debate about pay-for-performance incentive 
structures (see Harrison, 2015), due to ongoing dissatisfaction with national reform 
efforts and with international test score comparisons (Hanushek, 2009), and due to 
improvements in data collection, storage and reporting (American Statistical Association, 
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2014). Of particular note are recent improvements in statistical methods available for 
teacher accountability using student test data. Tennessee was the first state to pass 
legislation requiring that a certain percentage of teacher evaluations came from student 
test data. This was made possible by the work of William Sanders (Sanders, 1999) and 
colleagues who developed an early form of what is widely referred to as value-added 
modeling. Value-added models are statistical models that use student growth on 
standardized tests in an attempt to isolate teacher contributions to student learning.  
 The use of value-added models for teacher evaluation is controversial (see Baker 
et al., 2010), but some argue that the potential benefit of being able to objectively identify 
high and low performing teachers is substantial from both an educational and economic 
standpoint (Hanushek, 2009; Hanushek, 2011). The basis for this argument stems from 
evidence indicating that teacher proficiency is related to immediate and long-term student 
growth (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; Ladd, 2008; Nye, Konstantopoulos, 
& Hedges, 2004). Good teachers have a positive impact on test scores, and evidence 
suggests that test scores are related to attainment outcomes such as college attendance 
and employment (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Currie, & Thomas, 1999). 
Consequently, there is a precedent to identify and remove the lowest performing teachers 
from the teaching pool. Hanushek (2009) argues that if the lowest performing teachers 
were replaced with average teachers on a national scale, the United States would be able 
to shrink international proficiency discrepancies substantially within a short window. 
Hypothetically, gains in test scores would translate into economic and quality of life 
improvements nationally. The use of value-added models as an objective measure of 
teacher proficiency is central to this argument and hinges on the premise that value-added 
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models can accurately distinguish teachers of varying levels of proficiency. This is a 
high-stakes approach to teacher evaluation. Teachers would face remediation or loss of 
employment depending on student growth on standardized assessments. Therefore, the 
accuracy and precision of value-added models has practical, ethical, and legal 
implications. Teachers misidentified as underperforming face unnecessary sanctions. 
Already there are cases where school districts have been sued by teachers questioning the 
validity of value-added results (see Amrein & Berliner, 2002).  
 Research on conventional value-added models has demonstrated mixed evidence 
that they can identify high and low performing teachers without bias (Harris, 2011). Bias 
in the statistical sense is a tendency for the model to consistently over or under-estimate 
model parameters. Lack of bias is essential for the efficacy of value-added modeling for 
teacher evaluation, but lack of bias alone is not sufficient if value-added models are to be 
used for high stakes teacher evaluation. High stakes evaluation will also require a high 
degree of precision. Without sufficient precision, value-added models will only be able to 
identify high and low performing teachers on average. Being able to identify high and 
low performance on average is useful for school level evaluation, but if the goal is to 
identify and remediate teachers who are not contributing sufficiently to student learning, 
a high degree of precision is necessary in order to avoid classification errors.  
 Small sample sizes for estimating teacher value-added (i.e., classroom size) 
makes the precision issue a difficult problem to solve (Baker et al., 2010). A strategy 
used in practice to bolster sample sizes for estimating teacher value-added effects is to 
pool test data from consecutive years (McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaley, 2009). 
Even so, there is evidence that error rates viewed as acceptable in scientific research are 
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only obtained after pooling upwards of 11 years of test data (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). 
This presents a difficult practical challenge which limits that hypothetical benefits of 
teacher evaluation driven by value-added modeling. 
 In recent years there has been a focus within evaluation research on teacher 
evaluation which incorporates several different measures into a composite indicator of 
teacher quality (see Koretz 2008; Strunk, Weinstein, & Makkonen, 2014). Traditional 
evaluation methods, such as principal observations, are criticized for being subjective and 
too imprecise to identify any but the highest and lowest performing teachers (Muijs, 
2006; Tucker, 1997) Even so, there is long-standing evidence from psychometric 
research suggesting that several imperfect measures can be combined to improve the 
overall precision of an assessment (Guilford, 1946). Recent research has been conducted 
considering methods for combining value-added results with more traditional forms of 
teacher evaluation (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013) and for considering 
the statistical efficacy of approaches which use composite indicators (Garrett & 
Steingberg, 2014). Central to the proposed study is the Measures of Effective Teaching 
(MET) project (Kane, McCaffrey Miller, & Staiger, 2013). The MET project was a large 
scale, randomized experiment which evaluated the merits of a composite indicator that 
incorporated a value-added estimate, a principal observation and a student-teacher 
evaluation into a single indicator of teacher quality. It was found that the composite 
indicator in question could be used to estimate teacher quality with a high degree of 
precision on average. This was accomplished by comparing estimates obtained under 
random and non-random conditions for the same group of teachers. The MET project and 
its relevance for the current study is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.  
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Purpose and Nature of Study 
 The purpose of the current study was to investigate the magnitude of 
improvement to estimated precision that can be expected under varying conditions when 
comparing value-added to composite indicators of teacher quality. The MET project 
established that a composite measure of teacher quality can be used to identify high and 
low performing teachers with a high degree of precision on average. It was not known 
whether a composite measure such as the one used in the MET project could be adapted 
and used generally for high stakes teacher evaluation across a variety of educational 
contexts and for individual teachers. To address this, the goal for the current study was to 
evaluate the precision of a composite measure for teacher evaluation using statistical 
error derived from a variety of simulated contexts.  
 The current study was a Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulations are 
used in educational research to inform methodological practice (see Mass & Hox, 2004; 
Mass & Hox, 2005). Achievement data were simulated representing a variety possible 
educational contexts (e.g., variation in class and school sizes, variation in the 
relationships between composite indicators), teacher quality was estimated using a basic 
value-added model and a composite measure, and the precision of the two approaches 
were compared. The advantage of a simulation design is that a variety of realistic 
conditions were simulated in order to investigate a plausible range of improvement that 
can be expected when comparing the two teacher evaluation methods. The strategy for 
the current study was to first replicate Schochet and Chiang’s (2010) primary finding 
(i.e., 10 to 11 years of data are required to estimate teacher effects with nominal error 
rates using conventional value-added), and then to investigate the precision of a 
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composite measure fit to the same data. The information gained from the current study 
informed questions about the extent to which composite indicators of teacher quality may 
alleviate current limitations in the application of value-added models in high stakes 
teacher evaluation.  
Hypotheses 
H1 It was hypothesized the number of evaluation cycles needed to estimate 
teacher effectiveness using nominal error rates would be fewer when 
fitting a composite model to the simulated achievement data compared to 
a value-added model. 
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 Several simplifying assumptions and delimitations were made in the data 
generation process. Assumptions are better discussed in Chapter III alongside a detailed 
description of the data generation process, but an important limitation is mentioned here. 
Generalizability of the proposed study was limited by the fact that the study is a 
simulation. The goal of the current study was to explore the range of plausible 
improvement to precision that might be expected when comparing value-added to 
composite teacher evaluation methods. Implications drawn from research findings depend 
on the extent to which the data generation process accurately simulated realistic 
conditions. Simulation parameters were chosen by drawing from applied research to best 
approximate realistic data. More detail can be found in Chapter III regarding choices and 
justification driving the simulation process.  
Definition of Key Terms 
Value-added model. Meyer and Dokumaci (2009) define value-added models as a 
class of quasi-experimental statistical models used in education to estimate contributions 
made by districts, schools or teachers to student growth. Student growth in this context is 
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generally measured using state wide standardized assessment. Several different value-
added models are used in practice which vary primarily with regards to the use of control 
structures included for the purposes of limiting the influence of external factors 
contributing to student growth (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 
2004). 
Hierarchical linear model. Garson (2013) defines hierarchical linear models 
(HLMs) as multilevel statistical models designed to handle non-independent data 
structures. HLMs are used widely as value-added models in education to estimate value-
added effects (McCaffrey et al., 2004) due to the fact that data in education generally 
involves non-independent observations nested within classes, schools and districts. 
Type-A and type-B value-added effects. Value-added effects are individual 
estimates of value-added for teachers, levels or schools, depending on the level of 
analysis. Raudenbush (2004) distinguished between type-A and type-B effects based on 
their use in educational policy. Type-A effects are used informally to identify student 
growth occurring above or below expected values. Type-B effects are used in an 
evaluative capacity as they are viewed as evidence of responsibility for student growth 
above or below expected values. Therefore, type-B effects are higher stakes for those 
evaluated and have a higher burden of proof necessary for their use in educational 
evaluation.  
Systematic error. Systematic error in value-added estimation is error which has an 
underlying pattern (Harris, 2011). This pattern may be caused by something unobserved 
in the model, such as student sorting, or in some cases it may be caused by the estimation 
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method. Estimation bias may result from systematic errors which cause consist over or 
under estimation of the model parameters. 
Random error. Random error is value-added estimation is error caused by 
sampling or measurement idiosyncrasies. Random errors reduce estimation precision and 
increase confidence intervals around value-added effects. A proportionally large amount 
of within-student variation on achievement measures is responsible for low precision of 
teacher value-added effects (Schochet & Chiang, 2010) 
Summary 
 Simulated achievement data was used to compare the statistical precision of two 
teacher evaluation methods. The intent was to investigate whether and to what extent a 
composite measure would improve on the precision of a stand-alone value-added 
approach. It was found that the composite measure did estimate teacher effectiveness 
with better precision than a stand-alone value-added model on average, but that the 
improvement varied across simulated conditions. The improvement was greatest when 
sample sizes were small, when composite indicators where highly correlated, and when 
fewer evaluation cycles were used to estimate teacher effects. These findings suggest that 
there is a trade-off between logistics and statistical precision when comparing the more 
resource intensive composite approach to the stand-alone value-added approach. For 
practice, this may mean that considerations for using a composite approach must be 
weighed against both increased cost and improvement to estimation precision that can be 
expected given local conditions.  
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Chapter II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Value-Added Modeling and Policy 
 Value-added models are a special class of growth models used in education for 
school and teacher evaluation. The term “value-added” refers to the idea that these 
models aim to identify contributions to student learning which can be attributed to a 
district, school or teacher, depending on the level of analysis. Value-added effects 
represent the quantity or extent to which a teacher or educational institution “added” to 
student learning. There is significant controversy surrounding the use of value-added 
models for evaluation. Yet, many researchers have expressed optimism that they can be 
used as an objective assessment of school and teacher performance, assuming value-
added effects are estimated reliably and without bias. The following will provide an 
overview regarding basic theory behind value-added modeling. Subsequent sections will 
be used to discuss the controversy and potential benefits of value-added modeling in 
education.  
There are various types of value-added models used in practice and in research, 
but all value-added models utilize the same basic approach. The goal for any value-added 
model is to determine the amount of student growth attributable to the teacher, school or 
district. To ascertain this value, student growth is first predicted within an organization 
(i.e., within a school, district or state). Student growth can be predicted using covariates 
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and can be specified for groups or even for individual observations. To determine the 
amount of growth attributable to the evaluative unit of interest, actual growth is compared 
against predicted growth. The difference between actual and predicted growth is the 
“value-added.”  
A basic value-added model used to evaluate teachers at a single school would 
predict student growth using average student performance on a standardized test within a 
school. To calculate value-added scores for teachers, student scores would be aggregated 
at the classroom level, and each teacher would receive a value-added score based on the 
average deviation of student scores for his or her classroom from the school mean. 
Teachers would be assigned scores representing the extent to which students in his or her 
classroom performed better or worse than the school mean on average. Deviation from 
“typical” growth is interpreted as growth which can be attributed to the teacher, whether 
positive or negative. Value-added scores are implicitly normative, as deviation from the 
established growth mean can be interpreted as deviation around average teacher 
performance within a school, district or state. Value-added scores attempt to answer a 
hypothetical: “How different would average student learning be if the teacher’s 
contribution to student learning was average?” Thus, value-added scores indicate the 
extent to which a teacher (or school or district) added more or less to student learning 
compared to an average teacher. 
William Sanders, a primary contributor to the early development of value-added 
models for educational use, compared value-added models to physical growth charts 
(Sanders, 1998). Smooth growth charts seen in doctor’s offices are arrived at by 
aggregating growth across a large group of children. Growth charts provide doctors and 
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parents with a reasonable expectation regarding the physical growth of children as they 
age. Growth for individual children does not generally follow the smooth pattern seen in 
growth charts. For most children, there are deviations from the general pattern 
characterized by what Sanders called “dimples” or “bubbles.” By investigating “dimples” 
occurring in children from the same or similar contexts, one might be able to speculate 
about the causes of shared deviations from typical growth patterns. In the same way, 
growth in student achievement follows an approximately smooth curve after aggregating 
across a student body within a classroom or school. When shared deviations occur within 
a classroom or school, there is tentative evidence that some aspect of the classroom or 
school contributed to the unexpected growth (or lack of growth). Almost all value-added 
models derive from this basic strategy (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Value-added models 
vary in regards to how expected growth is calculated, but nearly all models form 
estimates of teacher, school or district effectiveness by comparing expected and actual 
growth for students aggregated at the desired level of analysis. 
The approach described above is a general approach to value-added modeling. 
Most value-added models in practice are hierarchical to account for clustered data 
structures (data structures with non-independent observations within groups), a common 
problem in education due to the fact that students are typically sorted to teachers in a non-
random fashion. Hierarchical models model variability at different levels within the data 
(e.g., variability between classrooms and variability within classrooms), a strategy which 
adjusts standard errors to account for non-random student sorting (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). In practice, covariates are often employed to adjust predicted student growth. 
Student SES, average SES within a classroom, prior student achievement scores, and 
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estimated teacher effects of prior teachers are examples of covariates sometimes used in 
the specification of value-added models (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Covariates, whether at 
the student, teacher, or district level, adjust predicted student growth in an attempt to 
eliminate bias introduced by factors outside the control of the teacher or institute under 
evaluation. While less common in practice, various model complexities have been 
investigated in research settings. Researchers have investigated the advantages of mixed 
models which model varying and time varying covariates as fixed and random effects 
(see Hibpshman, 2004), cross-classified models which weight value-added estimates 
across teachers who share students (see Heck, 2009), and models which adjust for 
variability in measurement errors across student scores (see Koedel, Leatherman, & 
Parsons, 2012).  
Educational Precedent for  
Value-Added Models 
 
Value-added estimates are used to inform different accountability and information 
systems. Raudenbush (2004) refers to type-A and type-B value-added effects to 
distinguish between the different ways value-added effects are used in evaluative 
contexts. The two effects are estimated the same way but used to make different kinds of 
evaluative decisions. Type-A effects are more or less descriptive in nature. They are used 
to answer the question: "Where is growth occurring?" For type-A effects, no attempt is 
made to answer who or what is responsible for student growth. Type-B effects, on the 
other hand, are inferential. When estimating type-B effects, an explicit attempt is made to 
isolate the casual structure of student growth. For type-B effects, the question is: "Who or 
what is responsible for student growth, and to what extent?" A less statistical way to 
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characterize the difference between type-A and type-B effects is to understand the 
different implications the two approaches have on policy.  
Type-A effects are used in low-stakes contexts in which the goal is to identify 
where growth is occurring above or below expected values. This information may drive 
further efforts to identify and understand the reasons behind unexpected growth. Implicit 
in the use of type-A effects is the understanding that statistical uncertainty limits 
conclusions about who or what is directly responsible for student growth. Consequently, 
type-A effects are not used to inform decisions determining hiring, retention and pay.  
Type-B effects, on the other hand, are used in an attempt to assign direct 
responsibility for student growth to teachers or schools. Type-B effects have very 
different policy implications. If the amount of growth in student learning can be 
attributed to individual teachers or schools, rewards and sanctions can be allotted for 
performance above or below the average. Two factors make type-B effects challenging to 
estimate and use fairly practice.  
First, the estimation of type-B effects requires that factors contributing to student 
learning confounded with but outside the control of the teacher are sufficiently 
controlled. Failing to do so can result in teachers being unfairly rewarded or sanctioned. 
Non-random assignment of students to teachers is often discussed in value-added 
literature as a potential influence on student achievement that may unfairly bias value-
added estimation (see Rothstein, 2008). The second factor which makes type-B effects 
difficult to use fairly in practice is the precision with which they are estimated. Precision 
determines the magnitude of the confidence intervals around individual estimates of 
value-added effects. Without adequate precision, it would not be possible to distinguish 
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between teachers responsible for different levels of student growth. Class size is a 
primary factor limiting estimation precision of value-added effects for teachers (Harris, 
2011).  
The focus of the current study was on type-B estimates with regards to both their 
practical benefit for educational assessment and evaluation and with regards to the 
statistical challenges limiting their current use. The goal for the current study was to 
compare methods for estimating type-B effects which may help to address these 
challenges. Literature on both bias and precision in value-added estimation was reviewed 
in the sections on systematic and random errors, respectively. Before literature on these 
statistical considerations was reviewed, the argument was made that type-B effects have 
potential to improve education generally if used as a central component in high-stakes 
teacher evaluation. This is assuming that concerns about both statistical bias and 
precision can be addressed 
The use of type-B estimates in educational evaluation is controversial (see Baker 
et al., 2010; Braun, 2005; Corcoran, 2010). For reasons briefly described above, the 
validity and accuracy of value-added effects are sometimes questioned when used in an 
evaluative capacity (Konstantopoulos, 2014). Despite the controversy, some districts are 
starting to use type-B estimates as drivers in merit pay systems determining teacher 
bonuses, pay increases and sanctions. Districts in Texas, Florida and New York have 
implemented merit based pay systems which use value-added effects to determine 
bonuses (Podgursky, & Springer, 2007). In Dallas, teachers with high value-added 
estimates from previous school years were offered substantial bonuses for agreeing to 
teach in disadvantaged schools (Schochet & Chian, 2010). Some districts are using value-
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added effects to make decisions about hiring and retention. In 2011, 221 teachers in a 
Texas school district were non-renewed in part due to value-added estimates derived 
from student achievement scores (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Limitations in 
data systems and statistical modeling prevented the widespread use of data driven 
evaluation systems in the past. This problem is becoming less of a concern as access to 
complex data ingestion and management systems becomes more accessible at the school 
and district levels (Lockwood, McCaffrey, Hamilton, Stecher, Le, & Martinez, 2007).  
Despite ongoing controversy, researchers and legislators have expressed optimism 
regarding the uses of type-B effects as powerful tools in educational reform and 
improvement (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Sanders, Wright, & Horn, 1997). In a 
public statement, the American Educational Research Association (2014) argued that 
high stakes accountability systems in general could be used to inspire teachers and 
students to put forth greater effort, and could be used to direct public attention and 
resources towards achievement disparities. Validity research has supported the notion 
that high-stakes accountability systems driven by value-added models can in fact promote 
positive long-term attainment based outcomes. Chetty et al. (2011) linked public records 
to a data set in which value-added estimates were formed for a sample of 3rd through 8th 
grade teachers. They were looking for relationships between adult outcomes and the 
value-added estimates of teachers from an adult's past. Chetty et al. reported finding that 
individuals who had teachers with higher value-added scores were more likely to attend 
college, earned better salaries, were more likely to live in higher SES neighborhoods, and 
were less likely to have a teenage pregnancy. These findings suggest that at least on 
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average, value-added estimates convey meaningful information about teacher quality and 
a teacher's influence on student lives.  
Much of the enthusiasm for the use of value-added effects in teacher evaluation 
comes from two sources. Many question the efficacy of observational methods for 
assessing teacher quality, such as principal observations. Therefore, there is a need for 
objective, accurate teacher evaluation methods. Secondly, America compares poorly on 
international benchmarks of student achievement creating a precedent for high-stakes 
reforms.  
Principle evaluations and other traditional methods of teacher evaluation are 
widely viewed as subjective and unreliable (Muijs, 2006). Evidence that observational 
methods reliably distinguish teachers is mixed (Glazerman et al., 2008). Research has 
demonstrated that principle evaluations can be used to detect teachers responsible for 
either the highest or lowest amount of student growth, but the majority of teachers cannot 
be reliably distinguished (Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). Others have demonstrated that 
principal evaluations are often subjective, typically inflated, and easily swayed by 
suggestions from outside influences (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). The subjective 
nature of principal evaluations limits their usefulness as a sole component in high stakes 
accountability systems.  
Evidence from literature on teacher evaluation suggests that teacher experience, 
levels of training, and prior education are also poor predictors of student growth. Teacher 
experience is moderately associated with student test scores, but the effect is strongest in 
the first five years of teaching (Papay & Kraft, 2015). After the first five years of 
teaching, teacher experience explains only five percent of the variation in student test 
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scores (Nye et al., 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). Certification type and degree 
levels are not strongly associated with student test scores either (Constantine et al., 2009). 
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) compared student test scores of students belonging to 
teachers certified through university or college programs and to teachers certified through 
alternative programs not affiliated with secondary institutions. Differences between the 
two groups were non-significant at .01 standard deviations in units of student 
achievement. The difference disappeared completely after two years teaching experience. 
They also reported that neither undergraduate GPA nor institutional affiliation could be 
used to predict student achievement. Research into the validity of content knowledge 
licensure tests have shown that licensure tests are associated with student achievement in 
the first two years of teaching, but that the differences between students who fail and 
students who pass diminishes as teachers gain experience (Goldhaber, 2007). To 
summarize, evidence from the literature raises questions about whether traditional 
indicators of teacher quality such as principal evaluations, teacher experience, or 
certification status are strongly associated with student test scores. 
The second factor motivating pressure for the use of value-added effects in 
teacher evaluation comes from international comparisons in which the United States 
performs poorly on assessments of math and science compared to other developing 
nations. Researchers and policy makers cite international comparisons as precedent 
necessitating stronger, more objective methods of teacher and school evaluation 
(Goldhaber & Hansen 2008; Hanushek, 2009). In 2003, U.S. students scored below 
average on the mathematical and reading sections of the Program for International 
Student Assessment, scoring similar to students in Russia and Latvia (Hanushek, 2009). 
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More recent comparisons rank the U.S. behind 29 other developed countries in 
mathematics and 22 other countries in science (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). A 
variety of ongoing efforts to improve student test scores have included reform targeting 
per-pupil spending (OECD, 2013), class size (Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 2002), teacher 
training and induction programs (Glazerman et al., 2008), and teacher qualification 
standards (Ladd, 2008). The U.S. spends more annually per pupil than almost any other 
country in the world, and per pupil spending has increased by more than 50 percent in the 
last three decades (OECD, 2013). Despite ongoing reforms and impressive per-pupil 
spending, achievement scores as measured by the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress have improved only marginally since the 1970's (Hanushek, 2009; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2015).  
In a paper titled Teacher Deselection, Hanushek (2009) extroplated as to how 
high stakes teacher evaluation could be used to shrink differences between the U.S. and 
top performing nations. Hanushek argued that by identifying and replacing teachers rated 
in the 10th percentile and below with average teachers, the United States could improve 
its ranking by .5 to 1 standard deviations within the span of a decade. This would place 
the U.S. in the top 5 or so nations on measures of math and science. The benefits of this 
reform effort are not limited to education. In a separate paper, Hanushek (2011) argued 
that the economic impact of teachers is substantial. Hanushek speculated that by 
replacing the bottom 5 – 8 percent of teachers with average teachers, the United States 
economy would see an increase of 80 – 100 trillion dollars produced over the span of a 
decade. The basis for this argument stems from the idea that good teachers impact student 
test scores, and that test scores are associated with long-term attainment based outcomes 
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for students. Earlier in this chapter, evidence supporting the link between test scores and 
attainment was discussed (see Chetty et al., 2011). The link between effective teaching 
and test scores is also central to Hanushek’s claims. Evidence suggesting a strong 
relationship between teacher effectiveness and student achievement was discussed below. 
Nye et al. (2004) conducted a literature review in which they were looking for 
research that isolated the amount of variation in student test scores attributable to 
classroom differences. They reported that across seven studies, 7% to 21% of the 
variance in student achievement growth was associated with variance between 
classrooms. This finding suggests that a substantial amount of variation in student test 
scores can be explained by differences between teachers. To investigate the plausibility 
of these figures using empirical methods, Nye and colleagues went on to conduct a 
randomized experiment in which kindergarten through 3rd grade teachers and students 
were randomly assigned classrooms. Teacher effects were estimated for the sample of 
teachers using achievement growth data collected during a learning unit. For 
mathematics, they found that a one standard deviation change in teacher effectiveness 
was associated with roughly a .13 standard deviation change in student achievement 
growth. The effect for reading was slightly smaller at .07 standard deviations. To 
illustrate the significance of this finding, Nye and colleagues explain that the difference 
in student growth when comparing a teacher in the 25th and 75th percentile of 
effectiveness would be .35 standard deviations for reading and .48 standard deviations for 
math. Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) confirmed these figures in a more recent study. 
Aggregating findings across ten studies, they estimated that on average, a one standard 
deviation change in a teacher’s value-added score was associated with a .17 standard 
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deviation change for student math scores, and a .13 standard deviation change for student 
reading scores. Rivkin et al. (2005) estimated average achievement gains for cohorts of 
students using average teacher and school value-added effects. Rivkin and colleagues 
estimated that the differences between an average and a good teacher on a measure of 
student growth was .11 standard deviations. Assuming this figure is correct, Rivkin and 
colleagues contended that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in teacher 
effectiveness on student achievement growth is comparable to a class size reduction of 
ten students. Using the same figure, Hanushek (2009) points out that when the compound 
effect of good teachers and average teachers is compared over five years, the difference 
in growth would be equivalent to the achievement difference between low-income and 
middle-income students sometimes referred to as the "achievement gap,” assuming the 
teacher effect is constant over time. Importantly, the estimation method used by Rivkin 
and colleagues is a lower bound estimate. The actual effect of the teacher on student 
achievement is likely greater than what was estimated.  
A study conducted by Kane et al. (2008) compared the impacts of traditional 
indicators of teacher quality, such as experience and certification status, to teacher value-
added estimates on student growth. Kane and colleagues found minimal evidence to 
suggest that teacher certification status had a measurable impact on student achievement 
growth as measured by standardized test scores. The magnitude of the teacher effect on 
student growth was both consistent with the estimates obtained in the research 
summarized above (.10) and a far more powerful influence on student growth than 
certification status or experience. Using the figure reported, Kane et al. explained that an 
increase in teacher value-added of one standard deviation was equivalent to the student 
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growth expected when comparing a novice teacher to a teacher with eight years of 
experience.  
To summarize, there is substantial evidence demonstrating an association between 
variability in teacher value-added estimates and student growth. Drawing from these lines 
of research, Hanushek’s argument is that by identifying and removing the lowest 
performing teachers from the pool of practicing teachers and replacing them with average 
teachers, average student test scores would improve dramatically in a short period of 
time. Using back of the napkin estimates, Hanushek claims that the increased costs of 
hiring and retaining more capable teachers would be quickly outpaced by increases to 
national gross domestic product resulting from improved educational and economic 
outcomes.  
There is favorable evidence suggesting that reform efforts targeted at teachers, 
such as Hanushek’s “teacher deselection” approach, are justified. Much of the variation 
in teacher effectiveness exists within rather than between schools (Hanushek et al., 2005), 
indicating that whole-school reform efforts would have less effect on student 
achievement than efforts targeting individual teachers. Other researchers have proposed 
similar reform efforts driven by high-stakes teacher evaluation. Gordon et al., (2006) and 
Nye et al. (2004) argued that teachers in lower performing quartiles wouldn’t need to be 
removed necessarily but could identified for support in the form of additional training or 
interventional couching.  
Implicit to Hanushek’s argument and other similar arguments is the notion that 
value-added effects can be estimated for teachers as valid, reliable and precise and that 
basic assumptions underlying the statistical design are tenable (Braun, 2005). The ethical 
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and legal nature of this proposal, as well as its effectiveness, hinges on whether or not 
teacher value-added estimates are truly indicative of teacher quality. The arguments and 
evidence reviewed above suggest that type-B value-added estimates could be used to 
catalyze valuable educational reform. To that end, evidence regarding both the statistical 
bias and precision of value-added estimates was reviewed in the proceeding sections. 
Error in Value-Added Modeling 
The question of whether or not value-added measures can be used to assess the 
quality of teaching depends on the amount of error associated with value-added 
estimates. Statistical error is deviation of an estimated value from its theoretical value. In 
the context of value-added modeling, error is the difference between a teacher’s 
estimated effectiveness and a teacher’s actual effectiveness. Value-added estimates 
cannot be used effectively or fairly to judge teacher quality when the difference between 
estimated teacher quality and actual teacher quality becomes too large.  
Harris (2011) differentiated between two types of error in value-added models: 
systematic and random. Systematic error is error which has some consistent, underlying 
pattern. When unaccounted for in the statistical model, systematic error may bias 
estimates of teacher effectiveness resulting in effects consistently estimated above or 
below population values (Murphy, 2012). Biased estimates in high stakes evaluation is a 
particular concern as factors outside the control of the teacher, such as student 
demographics or variation in classroom resources, may contribute to biased estimation. 
Student tracking, for example, is a potential, often discussed source of systematic error. 
Student tracking is known to cause biased estimation of value-added effects when student 
demographics are unequally distributed across teachers (McCaffrey et al., 2004). The 
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second type of error, random error, has no underlying pattern. Random error results from 
idiosyncrasies in sampling or measurement variance. Random error is like noise. It is 
responsible for reducing the precision of value-added estimates. The magnitude of 
confidence intervals around teacher effects is proportional to the amount of random error 
present in the estimate. As random error increases, confidence in the accuracy of 
estimated value-added effects decreases. 
Harris further differentiated between two kinds of random error. Measurement 
error is error associated with the test instrument. Value-added estimates are typically 
derived from achievement scores on state-wide standardized test, and so measurement 
error in the context of value-added modeling is generally error associated with the 
reliability of a state test. Measurement error is also introduced when there is a mismatch 
between the content of the state test and the content covered in the classroom (Baker et 
al., 2010). The other source of random error, sampling error, is caused by idiosyncrasies 
between samples. All things being equal, a teacher would receive two different value-
added estimates for two different samples of students. Sampling error can be thought of 
as variation in the distribution of value-added estimates derived from a hypothetical 
sample of samples (i.e., classes). Starting with systematic errors, the following is a 
literature review in which the impacts of systematic and random errors on value-added 
estimation were investigated. 
Systematic Error 
Value-added scores are typically estimated using growth scores computed as the 
change in achievement across two or more years of achievement data (Harris, 2011; 
McCaffrey et al., 2004). The advantage of using growth scores for estimating teacher 
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value-added is that growth scores reduce bias when two or more time-points are used, 
and when systematic error is constant over time (Harris, 2011; Koedel & Betts, 2011; 
Murphy, 2012; Rothstein, 2009). This is due to the fact that systematic error, unlike 
random error, is theoretically constant across testing occasions. Teacher effects derived 
from attainment scores are potentially biased by time-constant factors outside the 
teacher’s control (Harris, 2011) 
The fact that systematic errors are somewhat controlled through the use of growth 
scores is one of the primary benefits of value-added models over attainment based 
models for teacher evaluation (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Even so, research on systematic 
errors in value-added modeling has demonstrated that under certain conditions, 
systematic errors can bias value-added estimates. Implicitly, the goal when using type-B 
value added estimation is to isolate the causal relationship between teacher and student 
growth. Braun (2005) explains that in order to derive casual, type-B estimates, the teacher 
"effect" must be thought of not as a "statistical descriptor" but rather, a "casual 
attribution." The problem with this leap from "descriptor" to "casual attribution" is that 
under non-experimental conditions, there is the non-ignorable possibility that growth 
attributed to the teacher or school is confounded with unobserved factors outside their 
control. Research has demonstrated that classroom size, percentages of highly mobile 
students, and administrative experience influence student achievement growth and are not 
typically controlled in conventional value-added models (Harris & Sass, 2006). Factors 
confounded with growth but unaccounted for in the model may introduce bias, especially 
when these factors are distributed unevenly across teachers or schools (McCaffrey et al., 
2004). Without being exhaustive, possible sources of systematic error in teacher value-
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added estimates include the non-random assignment of students to teachers and of 
teachers to schools (Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), unmeasured differences in 
resources by school, by classroom or by student learning outside of school (Harris & 
Sass, 2006), student mobility (Baker et al., 2010), and issues with curriculum and test 
alignment (Papay, 2011).  
The issue of non-random assignment of students to teachers and teachers to 
schools represents a significant statistical challenge and potential source of systematic 
error for value-added models (Konstantopoulos, 2013). Rothstein (2008, 2009) conducted 
two novel studies to investigate whether the non-random assignment of students to 
teachers introduced bias in conventional value-added specifications. He investigated the 
correlation between teacher value-added estimates and the achievement scores of students 
one grade level below the teachers in question. Assuming that non-random assignment of 
students to teachers is a negligible source of bias on teacher value-added scores, zero 
order correlations should have been observed between student test scores in 4th grade and 
value-added estimates for their teachers in 5th grade. Rothstein observed significant 
correlations between 4th grade scores and 5th grade value-added estimates. This finding 
implied that under conventional value-added specifications, teachers are being held 
responsible for some amount of unobserved student sorting. Rothstein qualified his 
finding by concluding that the influence of non-random sorting on value-added bias was 
severe only under certain conditions. According to Rothstein, bias introduced through 
non-random sorting is a concern when non-random sorting factors are idiosyncratic, 
when data are lacking in regards to classroom assignment, and when characteristics 
related to student sorting are unevenly distributed across teachers. 
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Non-random sorting is often the result of student tracking, parental pressure or 
administrative oversight (Rothstein, 2009). Monk (1987) found that while most principles 
tended to assign students to teachers in a roughly random fashion, a small percentage of 
principles used significant oversight when assigning students to teachers. The deliberate 
assignment of students to teachers can result in a consistent undervaluing or overvaluing 
of a teacher if achievement scores are used as part of the assignment process (Harris, 
2011; Rothstein, 2009). When students are assigned to teachers using achievement 
scores, students with very high or very low scores tend to score more conservatively 
(closer to the mean). This regression to the mean is confounded with estimates of teacher 
effectiveness. Teachers with upper track students can be consistently undervalued as 
students in their classes fail to demonstrate predicted growth on subsequent testing 
occasions. Further, higher measurement error associated with the test scores of lower 
track and second language students lowers the precision of estimates for teachers 
assigned to remediation courses and special education (Baker et al., 2010).  
Bias resulting from non-random assignment can be controlled by specifying 
student and classroom level covariates in the model. The inclusion of demographic and 
other measured covariates can reduce bias in value-added estimates to the extent that the 
covariates are associated with student tracking (Koedel & Betts, 2011). Classroom level 
covariates, mean classroom achievement, and the standard deviation for mean classroom 
achievement, have been shown to also reduce bias in teacher value-added estimates, 
though at a loss to precision (Protik, Walsh, Resch, Isenbert, & Kopa, 2013). That said, 
even when covariates are included, the non-experimental nature of the data in question 
makes it impossible to conclude that all relevant tracking variables are observed and 
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included (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Furthermore, because tracking is so complex, there is 
evidence suggesting that the use of covariates in the model is not sufficient to eliminate 
all sources of bias introduced by tracking. For example, value-added estimates are often 
correlated with student socio-economic status (SES) even after using controls, and 
teachers observed at different time points with both advantaged and disadvantaged 
students consistently score lower with disadvantaged students (Newton, Hammon, 
Haertel, & Thomas, 2010). Hill, Umland, Litke, and Kapitula (2012) also found similar 
correlations between teacher value-added estimates and average student SES.  
Unmeasured differences in classroom resources and influences on student 
achievement are a second class of potential systematic errors. A case study was 
conducted in which four teachers who were recently released from a Texas school district 
for low value-added scores were investigated (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). The 
researchers found considerable year-to-year variation in the value-added scores of the 
four teachers. Unmeasured classroom resources were proposed as a possible explanation 
for substantial year-to-year variation. A teacher’s aid was present during one of the years 
in which one of the four teachers received a positive value-added score. Unaccounted for 
in the statistical model, contributions to student learning made by the teacher’s aid were 
attributed to the head teacher. The result was a higher than expected value-added score 
for the head teacher. Variation in classroom resources confounded with student 
achievement may be difficult to track, measure or categorize (Harris & Sass, 2006). 
Examples of such factors include differences in out of school experiences and 
opportunities, such as museum visits, exposure to additional instruction and tutoring or 
the influence of older siblings (American Statistical Association, 2014; Baker et al., 
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2010). If such factors are non-constant over time, they may partly explain the 
considerable variation in year-to-year value added estimates documented in literature 
(Koedel & Betts 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2009; Netwon et al., 2010; Papay, 2011). 
Research on the stability of value-added estimates over time has revealed year-to-year 
correlations between value-added scores for the same teacher averaging between .2 and .5 
for elementary teachers and between .3 to .7 for middle school teachers (McCaffrey et al., 
2009). Rankings of individual teachers vary considerably from year-to-year. Somewhere 
between one-half to two-thirds of teachers in the top-quartile for a given year drop into 
lower categories in later years (Corcoran, 2010; Newton et al., 2010).  
Summer learning loss has been identified as a possible source of bias in value-
added effects (Baker et al., 2010; Papay, 2011). Summer learning loss is the measured 
effect of summer break on academic achievement scores. Students have been shown to 
score lower on standardized assessments at the end of summer compared to how they 
performed at the beginning of summer. There are different reports as to the magnitude of 
summer learning loss, but consistently reported is the finding that summer learning loss is 
most significant for lower SES students (Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2001). Upwards 
of 30% of the achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students can be 
explained by differences in summer learning loss (Harris, 2011). Because of this 
difference, summer learning loss has the potential to bias teacher value-added scores 
when the proportion of students in low SES are not evenly distributed across teachers. 
Bias introduced through summer learning loss on value-added estimates has been 
investigated by comparing spring-to-spring growth scores with fall-to-spring growth 
scores using the same cohort of teachers and students (Gershenson & Hayes, 2013). Even 
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after controlling for student SES and for student participation in summer activities, 
significant differences in the two estimates were found. The systematic error introduced 
through summer learning loss could potentially be reduced by distributing students of 
varying demographics evenly across teachers (Papay, 2011) or by changing spring-to-
spring testing cycles to fall-to-spring testing cycles (Gershenson & Hayes, 2013). 
Student mobility is another potential source of systematic error on value-added 
estimates (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004). Student mobility is challenging for the 
estimation of value-added scores because the timing of student transitions rarely 
corresponds to testing cycles. This introduces modeling challenges in which value-added 
effects from multiple sources (teachers and or schools) must be differentiated. Because 
higher mobility is more common among lower income demographics (Heinlein & Shinn, 
2000), systematic error in value-added estimation is possible where there is an unequal 
distribution of lower income students by schools or by teachers. The standard analytical 
approach for handling student mobility is to remove students from the analysis who did 
not spend an entire test cycle with at a single school or with a single teacher. Trump 
(2012) argues that there are two problems with this approach: a) It creates a disincentive 
to help traditionally difficult students, and b) the precision of value-added estimates for 
teachers with high mobility rates is reduced due to loss of sample size. Trump compared 
different modeling strategies for handling student mobility using data from Ohio's value-
added program. She found that the effect of student mobility on teacher estimates was 
large enough to bias estimates and that using a mobility indicator reduced bias. The 
inclusion of mobility indicators in value-added models would require that districts keep 
and maintain data on student mobility. One problem with this solution is that tracking 
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student mobility would incur additional data collection and handling costs, and districts 
with high mobility tend to be those with less resources.  
To conclude, there are several potential sources of systemic error which may bias 
standard value-added specifications. Non-random assignment of students to teachers has 
the potential to bias value-added estimates when unobserved student characteristics are 
associated with sorting and are unevenly distributed across teachers, when student 
characteristics influencing achievement are non-constant over time, and when students 
are tracked using achievement scores. Additional bias can be introduced when 
unobserved variation exists across classrooms with regards to resources, opportunities 
and student demographics.  
Evidence from the literature suggests that bias in value-added estimates can be 
managed to an extent. Value-added estimates are derived from growth scores. The use of 
growth alleviates constant sources of bias so long as student characteristics are evenly 
distributed across teachers (Harris, 2011; McCaffrey et al., 2004). For idiosyncratic 
sources of systematic variation, bias can be managed somewhat when factors confounded 
with achievement are controlled through the use of covariates (Koedel & Betts, 2011; 
Protik et al., 2013). The usefulness of covariates for reducing bias depends on the extent 
to which covariates are associated with student tracking and student achievement 
(McCaffrey, 2012). Administrative solutions can also help to reduce bias in value-added 
estimation. The random assignment of students to teachers is not possible in most applied 
settings, but there is evidence suggesting that conventional practices for assigning 
students to teachers which do not sort students using achievement scores provide 
sufficient randomization when a tracking indicator is used in the model (Protik et al., 
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2013). Lower SES students should be distributed evenly across teachers, as many of the 
potential sources of bias reviewed above, such as summer learning loss and high levels of 
mobility, are a more significant problem among low SES populations. The expansion of 
data collection and storage efforts can help to improve model specification. For example, 
a mobility indicator helps to reduce bias for teachers with high mobility populations 
(Trump, 2012). Finally, the scope of the comparison being made can be refined to control 
for unwanted systematic bias. If, for example, significant variation in resources and 
student demographics exists within a school district, baseline growth scores can be 
established within rather than between schools (McCaffrey, 2012). By only comparing 
teachers within schools, variation in resources between schools will not bias estimates. In 
short, the presence and extent of bias in value-added estimates introduced through 
systematic errors depends on model specification (which depends on the quality and 
availability of data), the structure and organization of the educational system in which 
measurements are made, and the scope with which predicted growth is derived.  
Random Error 
Random errors are responsible for the contribution of noise to parameter 
estimates. Without sufficient precision, confidence intervals around teacher estimates 
become too large for accurate classification or comparison (Konstantopoulos, 2013). 
Random errors in value-added estimates originate from two sources. Random errors arise 
from sampling errors and from errors associated with measurement. With regards to 
sampling error, the make-up of students in a given classroom is partly due to random 
factors. Given two different samples of students, the same teacher would receive different 
value-added estimates. The difference between a teacher's actual value-added score and a 
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teacher's estimated value added score attributable to the student sample is sampling error. 
The standard deviation of the hypothetical distribution of sample estimates is called 
standard error. Standard error is a function of sample size and of variation in the 
population and is used to calculate confidence intervals for value-added estimates. As 
sample size increases, the standard error decreases. Thus, increasing the sample size for a 
given teacher reduces the confidence interval around the teacher’s value-added score. A 
common strategy used in practice to reduce the magnitude of confidence intervals around 
value-added estimates is to aggregate across multiple years of classroom data for 
individual teachers (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Koedel, & Betts, 2011; Konstantopoulos, 
2013).  
Measurement error is error associated with the test instrument. In value-added 
contexts, state-standardized tests are often used to estimate value-added scores. Thus, 
measurement error of a value-added estimate is associated with the reliability of a state 
assessment. Measurement error is random. This is due to the fact that the items of the test 
can be thought of as a random sample of items from an infinite pool of possible items. 
Students in a hypothetical class will perform slightly differently on two tests which 
contain a random sample of possible questions. Measurement error is the difference 
between estimated and actual student ability estimated using a random sample of test 
questions.  
The use of growth scores to control systematic errors was discussed in the 
previous section. Unlike systematic errors, random errors are compounded by the use of 
growth scores (Harris, 2011). Random error (both sampling and measurement) is present 
during each testing occasion. There is an additive relationship between random errors 
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across testing occasions. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between systematic and 
random errors incurred from the use of growth scores (Harris, 2011). Lack of precision in 
value-added estimation limits the fair and ethical use of value-added modeling for high 
stakes evaluation (Konstantopoulos, 2013). A high degree of precision is required to 
accurately distinguish between teachers responsible for different levels of growth. Lack 
of precision could lead to teachers who are awarded or sanctioned due to chance. Ethical 
considerations notwithstanding, the inability to objectively and accurately distinguish 
teachers using student growth would limit the effectiveness of reform strategies designed 
to identify and replace teachers least responsible for growth (see Hanushek, 2009). 
Current research investigating the precision of value-added estimation was reviewed. 
Sampling error. The precision of value-added estimates for schools and for 
teachers is not the same. A much larger sample size is available for computing school 
level value-added estimates compared to teacher level value-added estimates. 
Consequently, school level value-added estimates can be computed with far more 
precision. The problem with school level value-added estimates is that with regards to 
contributions to student growth, there is much more variation within schools than 
between schools (Harris, 2011). This means that while school value-added effects can be 
estimated with greater precision, greater precision is also needed to accurately distinguish 
between schools contributing more or less to student growth. It is possible to compute 
value-added effects within grade levels (see Tekwe et al., 2004). The sample size within 
grade levels is larger than the sample size for individual teachers, but there is no obvious 
scheme for adapting grade-level value-added estimates for use as tools guiding high-
stakes policy decisions regarding teacher retention. 
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There is considerable variation in teacher effectiveness between teachers. Nye et 
al. (2004) aggregated findings across several studies estimating that somewhere between 
7% to 21% of variability in student achievement could be explained by variation in 
teacher effectiveness. This means that less precision is needed to compare teachers than 
to compare schools using value-added estimates. That said, sampling error is also 
considerably larger for teachers than for schools (Harris, 2011). This is caused primarily 
by limited sample sizes available for individual teachers. This problem is more 
pronounced in elementary school where the average national class size is 25 to 26 
students (Kane, Staiger, Grissmer, & Ladd, 2002). Underscoring the importance of 
sample size in value-added estimation, the average year-to-year correlation of value-
added estimates in elementary school is lower than in middle school or high school by a 
magnitude of .3 (McCaffrey et al., 2009). Generally speaking, year-to-year instability in 
teacher effects is fairly high, further illustrating the challenge of accurately estimating 
teacher effects with limited sample sizes. Papay (2011) estimated that year-to-year 
correlations of value-added estimates for elementary teachers is somewhere between .15 
and .58, and McCaffrey et al. (2009) estimated year-to-year correlations of value-added 
estimates somewhere between .30 to .70 for middle school teachers. Sass (2008) argued 
that without sufficiently stable value-added estimates, evaluations determining rewards or 
sanctions would undermine teacher motivation as they would be viewed capricious and 
unfair. This premise is supported by research across districts that use value-added high 
stakes evaluative systems to reward individual teachers. Such complaints are reportedly 
common (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). 
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Lack of precision for teacher value-added estimates has been shown to 
dramatically reduce classification accuracy. There is evidence that when using a 95% 
confidence interval, only the very lowest and very highest teachers can be accurately 
distinguished using conventional value-added specifications (Jacob & Lefgren, 2005). 
Papay (2011) found that within a Dallas school district awarding bonuses to teachers 
classified in the top 25th and 50th percentiles, one in four teachers who earned a bonus 
would lose it the following year, and 36% of teachers in the bottom percentiles would 
earn a bonus the following year. Sass (2008) observed that across five different districts, 
only 30% of teachers in the lowest percentiles would remain in the lowest percentiles 
after one year, and in the top quantiles, only 25% of the teachers would remain. Newton 
et al. (2010) argue that classifications using value-added effects should not vary so 
wildly, as it seems reasonable to assume that high quality teachers should remain high 
quality teachers year-to-year, even while allowing for small amounts of idiosyncratic 
variation. Large confidence intervals and classification errors represent an ongoing, 
unresolved problem for type-B style evaluative systems. Researchers have consistently 
questioned whether value-added models can be used fairly as the sole component in 
evaluative high stakes teacher evaluation (see Braun, 2005; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010; 
Hill, Kapitula, & Umland, 2011; Kane et al., 2002).  
Data can be pooled across multiple assessment periods to increase sample sizes 
for individual teachers. This tactic makes it difficult to estimate value-added effects for 
new teachers (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010), but it does increase effective sample sizes for 
estimating teacher value-added effects. Research has shown that by pooling data from 
three assessment periods, stability of teacher effects increased by around 40% to 60% 
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compared to estimates derived from a single assessment period (McCaffrey et al., 2009). 
Even so, there is research which suggests that the improvement is not nearly enough to 
justify the sole use of value-added effects for high stakes evaluative decisions. Schochet 
and Chiang (2010) simulated achievement data and fit a conventional value-added model 
in order to test how many years of data would be required to estimate teacher value-
added effects using type I and type II error rates at levels commonly accepted as adequate 
in scientific research. They found that when using three years of data, 1 in 4 teachers who 
were average would be misclassified as among the highest or lowest performing teachers. 
Similarly, they found that 1 in 4 of the highest or lowest performing teachers would be 
misclassified as average. Furthermore, they observed diminishing returns on 
improvements to type-I errors gained from pooling data beyond three years. In total, 10 
years of data would be required to reduce classification error rates by half. Eleven years 
of data would be required to achieve type I error rates of .05 and type II error rates of .20. 
Schochet and Chiang's findings are likely understated due to the fact that they simulated 
data under somewhat idealistic conditions (e.g., random assignment of teachers to 
students and no student mobility).  
It is important to note that Schochet and Chiang compared both standard ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation and Empirical Bayes estimation techniques. Empirical 
Bayes estimation adjusts for estimated sampling error by “shrinking” estimates with low 
sample sizes to the mean (McCaffrey et al., 2004). Empirical Bayes estimation is a 
conservative approach which essentially favors the group average over the sample 
average when estimating individual effects for teachers with small sample sizes 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). While the use of Empirical Bayes estimations has been 
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shown to reduce sampling error (Chetty et al., 2011), it also results in increased type II 
error rates. In the context of value-added modeling, this means that teachers with small 
classes contributing significantly above or below the average to student learning will be 
classified as average more often under Empirical Bayes estimation than under OLS 
estimation. Whether or not Empirical Bayes estimation offers a realistic solution to the 
precision problem depends somewhat on the perspectives of different stakeholders. 
Schochet and Chiang argued that teachers likely view more conservative estimates as 
more fair, as the risk of a teacher being unfairly punished is reduced. On the other hand, 
one could argue that teachers with small classroom sizes would have less opportunity to 
earn rewards. Parents and administrators might worry that Empirical Bayes estimation 
will decrease the ability to identify underperforming teachers. The views of different 
stakeholders was discussed while considering the results of the current study in Chapter 
V. 
Instability and imprecision of teacher value-added estimates may also be due in 
part to the fact that achievement data are susceptible to non-persistent types of random 
error. Kane et al. (2002) talked about non-persistent types of variation as “other” 
variation. Other variation has the same practical effect on the precision of value added 
estimates as sampling error. Examples of “other” types of variation discussed by Kane et 
al. included variation in weather patterns, variation in teacher-student dynamics from 
year-to-year, or variations in routine and setting, such as school-wide remodeling 
projects. Using standardized test data from North Carolina and California, Kane et al. 
estimated that 50 to 80 percent of the change in mean fourth grade scores was non-
persistent. That is, changes in mean scores were due to "sampling variation or some other 
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non-persistent cause." (Kane et al., 2002, p. 248). The combination of sampling error and 
other, more difficult to track types of errors contributed to large confidence errors around 
estimates of teacher value added. To illustrate, the amount of variability in student 
achievement scores attributable to within-classroom student variability ranges from 80 to 
92 percent (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). In comparison, the amount of variability in 
student achievement scores explained by the combined variability of teacher and school 
value-added effects is around 5 to 8 percent. Because of the wide discrepancy in the 
variation of student growth attributable to the teacher and to sources outside the control 
of the teacher, estimating teacher value-added effects requires large sample sizes to 
effectively cut through the substantial amount of noise caused by sampling and 
idiosyncratic errors. And as demonstrated by the simulation research of Schochet and 
Chiang, the effective sample size required appears to exceed practical limitations.  
Measurement error. Teacher and school value-added effects are estimated using 
achievement data typically measured using state-wide standardized assessment. 
Measurement error is error associated with state tests or with differences between test 
content and instruction. Measurement error is considered random. This is because the 
items on a test are part of a hypothetical pool of items. Thus, the items on a given test are 
a sample of possible items, and there is a certain amount of random error introduced as a 
consequence. Research has been conducted investigating aspects of measurement error 
and the statistical properties of value-added models. There is evidence that teacher effects 
derived from conventional value-added are sensitive to violated assumptions when 
scaling achievement measures vertically (Ballou, 2009) and when aligning achievement 
measures horizontally (Lockwood et al., 2007; Newton et al., 2010; Papay, 2011). 
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Hypothetically, if a teacher's value-added score is stable over time, then estimates of 
teacher value-added should not be affected by test scaling or to the use of different 
achievement measures. An effective teacher should be labeled effective, regardless of 
how the test scores are scaled or which test is used. This research demonstrated that 
value-added effects are not independent from the measurement and that measurement 
error is a threat to both the precision and validity of value-added effects. 
Measurement error is relatively small for most state standardized tests. For 
example, Chronbach’s alpha for the Transitional Colorado Assessment Program ranged 
from .87 to .95 across subscales and has an average of .92 (Colorado Department of 
Education, 2012). Even so, there is evidence that measurement error in small degrees can 
reduce the precision of value-added estimates (Harris, 2011; Koedel et al., 2012). One 
concern is the fact that measurement error is not evenly distributed for all test takers. 
Measurement error is larger for students closer to the tails of an achievement distribution 
(Simon, Ercikan, & Rousseau, 2012). This means that while the average reliability for 
standardized tests is high, the reliability of scores within a given classroom may be low, 
especially if a classroom has a high concentration of students in the upper or lower 
achievement percentiles. This is supported by research in which higher within-class 
achievement variability is present in classrooms with lower achieving students (Baker et 
al., 2010). Koedel et al. (2012) investigated both the impact of measurement error on 
teacher value-added estimates and potential modeling solutions for handling test 
measurement error. They conducted a simulation to evaluate different modeling solutions 
and then applied their findings to state-wide achievement data obtained from Missouri. 
They found that by including information about measurement error in their model, 
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teacher value-added estimates were estimated more efficiently. Using sample size as a 
benchmark for comparison, they found that the gains in efficiency were roughly equal to 
an increase in classroom sample size of 11 to 17 percent. Their findings indicated that 
while test measurement error is slight compared to other random sources of error, it does 
contribute to the imprecision of teacher value-added estimates and can be alleviated 
somewhat by including information about measurement error in the model.  
Test scaling has also been researched as another potential source of measurement 
error. Achievement growth data are derived from the use of different tests at different 
grade levels. Value-added models typically assume that achievement data used to 
generate value-added estimates comes from a common, interval level scale (Ballou, 2009; 
Braun, 2005). Vertical scaling is a process by which tests at different grade levels are 
placed on a common scale. The basic strategy involves the use of common items which 
can be used to equate tests at adjacent grade levels. Braun (2005) argued that vertical 
scaling is at best a workable assumption when looking at no more than two adjacent 
grades, and that test validity suffers when raw achievement scores are converted to a 
common scale. To the extent that scaling assumptions are violated and achievement data 
should be more appropriately treated as ordinal, inferential errors are possible. To test 
this possibility, Ballou (2009) conducted a sensitivity analysis comparing the results of 
two different models fit to the same achievement data. In one model, the data were 
assumed to be interval and in the other, data were assumed to be ordinal. Ballou found 
that when comparing the two approaches, only 40 percent of the teachers in the top and 
bottom quartiles of the estimated value-added distributions were consistent. Ballou's 
finding suggested that assumptions underlying typical scaling procedures may not be 
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appropriate for data in achievement contexts. Inferential errors may result from 
unexamined assumptions typically ignored in practice. 
Summary of Research on  
Errors in Value-Added 
 
If value added modeling is to be used as a key piece of information driving high 
stakes teacher evaluation akin to proposals made by Hanushek (2009) and others, 
statistical accuracy and bias are non-trivial concerns. To that end, the literature reviewed 
thus far indicated somewhat mixed evidence with regards to bias and fairly conclusive 
evidence with regards to precision. With regards to bias, various studies indicated that 
bias caused by student tracking and by unevenly distributed student demographics across 
classrooms remains a problem for teacher value-added estimation (McCaffrey et al., 
2004; Rothstein, 2008; Rothstein, 2009), even when typically available controls are 
employed (Newton et al., 2010; Hill et al. , 2011). Other studies were more favorable 
indicating that bias is sufficiently reduced when controls are used which account for 
student tracking, student mobility, and the distribution of student demographics (Mihaly 
et al., 2013; Trump, 2012). There is evidence that bias can be managed through 
administrative means, such as by distributing students of different ability ranges across 
teachers (Rothstein, 2009), by comparing students using fall-to-spring testing cycles 
(Gershenson & Hayes, 2013), and by restricting the scope of the comparison between 
teachers to within individual schools (McCaffrey, 2012).  
The research on the accuracy of value added estimation is less qualified in 
comparison. Current evidence suggested that there is a high degree of instability in 
teacher value-added estimates from year-to-year (Kane & Staiger, 2008; McCaffrey et al., 
2009; Papay, 2011; Sass, 2008). Instability in teacher estimates is caused by a 
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combination of sampling error and other types of idiosyncratic variation at the student 
level (Kane & Staiger, 2008). Increasing the sample size for individual teachers by using 
multiple years of data to estimate teacher effects reduces sampling error, but to achieve 
type-I and type-II error rates comparable to those used in scientific research, upwards to 
10 to 11 years of data would be required (Schochet & Chiang, 2010). Lack of precision in 
value-added estimation is an ongoing practical and ethical hurdle if value-added 
estimates are to be used to identify and then either remove or remediate the lowest 
performing teachers from the teaching pool.  
Systemic Consideration of Value-Added 
In addition to the statistical challenges summarized above, there is a general 
distrust of value-added estimation among practicing educators. This distrust represents a 
second class of practical problems associated with the use of value-added modeling in 
high stakes evaluation. Invested parties have been careful to point out that even in the 
best of circumstances in which estimates are unbiased, stable and precise, there may be 
unintended consequences associated with their use (American Statistical Association, 
2014). The goal when using type-B effects is to improve education through 
accountability and objective teacher and school evaluation. Whether or not that goal can 
be achieved depends not only on the validity of the estimates themselves but also on how 
educational communities perceive and react to an accountability system driven by student 
achievement scores. Regarding the use of value-added estimates in high stakes decision 
making, the American Statistical Association (2014) commented in a public statement: 
"Perceptions of transparency, fairness and credibility will be crucial in determining the 
degree of success of the system as a whole…and how the educator labor market will 
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respond." There is evidence, for example, that changes to accountability systems in the 
last decade have influenced the amount of time teachers spend drilling test taking skills, 
using worksheets and practice tests, and teaching a narrow set of curricular standards 
(Volante, 2004). Type-B effects raise the stakes for teachers and schools by aligning 
rewards and sanctions with student achievement.  
As part of the Texas Educator Excellence Fund, merit-based pay has been tied to 
value-added estimates for several years in Texas (Podgursky, & Springer, 2007). Two-
hundred and thirty million dollars are allocated annually between districts meeting certain 
criteria with the stipulation that 60 percent of money is awarded to teachers based on 
student growth (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Teachers were reported to have 
expressed skepticism regarding the fairness of the system due to low stability of value-
added estimates from year-to-year. Teachers compared earning a bonus as similar to 
winning the lottery. High value-added scores were attributed to chance. On the other 
hand, teachers attributed low scores to the composition of students in their classes. There 
was also the expressed fear that teachers would be at a disadvantage for teaching content 
outside the prescribed curriculum. For some, there was a sentiment that cooperation was 
disincentivized due to the normative nature of value-added modeling. Teachers working 
in teams and teachers with student teachers expressed concern that they may be 
accountable for the performance of others. Teachers also reported hesitation to teach 
gifted students fearing that gifted students have less room to grow. Regardless of whether 
these perceptions are valid, a general belief that the system does not work has the 
potential to undermine its effectiveness if value-added estimates are intended to provide 
incentive and motivation for effort. Other research has shown that in some cases, teachers 
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react more favorably to merit based pay systems (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993), but no 
known study has been found which reports a generally positive sentiment among teachers 
where value-added estimates serve as the primary tool determining awards or sanctions. 
Teacher perceptions of fairness and credibility notwithstanding, there are other 
more systemic concerns surrounding the use of type-B value-added estimates. Research 
from value-added accountability systems in New York has shown that value-added 
estimates may trump other evaluative tools. Administrators have been shown to provide 
negative leaning teacher evaluations for teachers who have received poor value-added 
scores in prior years (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012). Schools with low value-added 
estimates have experienced difficulties with staffing possibly due to fear among 
applicants that they may receive low ratings, and real-estate agencies have started 
providing customers with school value-added estimates (American Statistical 
Association, 2014). Even before the introduction of high stakes accountability systems, 
there has been concerns that even low stakes accountability systems tend to narrow 
curricular focus and resource distribution (Koretz, 2008). Such tendencies may become 
even more pronounced under high stakes accountability systems. Finally, it is not clear 
that feedback from value-added models can be used consistently to improve instruction. 
Under some of the more popular value-added systems, teachers do not receive ratings 
until summer. In one study, 55 percent of teachers from a Texas district expressed 
difficulty interpreting results (Harris, 2011), and this may be attributable to a lack of 
training for both administrators and teachers. Additional training will require additional 
funding, a requirement that might tax the capabilities of less wealthy districts. 
Additionally, only a limited number of subjects taught in primary and secondary schools 
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are actually tested in most state assessments (Cimbricz, 2002). For most states, only a 
third of school subjects taught are covered on the state exam (Harris, 2011). Finally, there 
is no evidence that teachers removed through the use of value-added estimates will be 
replaced with more effective teachers (Baker et al., 2010).  
Composite Measures of Teacher Evaluation 
Given the combined statistical and practical concerns surrounding the use of value 
models for high stakes teacher evaluation, there is a general consensus among researchers 
that value-added estimates should not be used as the sole piece of information guiding 
policy decisions (see American Statistical Association, 2014; Raudenbush, 2004; Rubin, 
Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004). The basic argument is that value-added estimates in their 
current states provide useful information about both instructional quality and student 
growth but that value-added estimates are noisy, potentially biased and generally 
distrusted by educators. Therefore, they should not be the last word on teacher quality. 
Rather, value-added estimates should be used to identify and direct ongoing, coordinated 
teacher evaluation efforts. Betebenner, Wenning, and Briggs (2011) dubbed this 
particular use of value-added estimates the “shoe-leather approach.” The intent behind 
the name is that once identified through value-added effects, potentially underperforming 
classrooms or schools should be visited in an attempt to understand the nature of the 
problem through other qualitative or quantitative means. Compared to systems which use 
value-added estimates as a sole or primary component in teacher evaluation, the shoe-
leather approach is more rigorous and has better ecological validity. It does not, however, 
solve problems associated with biased evaluators, and, as mentioned in the preceding 
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sections, once identified as underperforming, evaluators tend to view teachers more 
negatively (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012).  
An alternative approach incorporates type-B value-added estimates into a 
composite measure of teacher effectiveness. Instead of using value-added estimates to 
identify teachers for further evaluation, all teachers would receive the same rigorous 
evaluative program comprised of various quantitative measures. A notable example of 
this approach comes from a study conducted by Kane et al. (2013). Kane and his 
colleagues designed the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) system which 
incorporated value-added estimates, student surveys and classroom observations into a 
composite measure of teacher quality. Results from the MET project are discussed below 
in which the argument is made that a composite measure of teacher effectiveness could 
be used to resolve the two main problems with evaluation systems driven by value-added 
model: accuracy and perceived fairness. First, evidence is discussed with regards to both 
principal evaluations and student surveys of teacher effectiveness to argue that neither 
form of evaluation could serve as a sole indicator of teacher quality. 
Principal evaluations. One of the reasons researchers and evaluators gravitated 
towards value-added measures originally was the fact that traditional methods of teacher 
evaluation were subjective and unreliable. Tucker (1997) found that most teacher ranked 
using principal evaluations rank as performing higher than average. Sarcastically, Tucker 
described principal evaluations as having a “Lake Wobegon Effect” effect. The Lake 
Wobegon Effect is a tongue and cheek reference to the show “Prairie Home Companion” 
in which the fictional town of Lake Wobegon is described as a place where everyone 
living there is above average. Muijs (2006) argued that problems with principal 
47 
 
 
 
evaluations stem from the fact that they are often artificial and lack methodological rigor 
and that the conflicting role of principals in which they are both leader and evaluator may 
explain some of the favorable bias. Evidence from empirical research supports the notion 
that principal evaluations are poor predictors of student achievement. Using three 
different samples of principals from school districts in Cincinnati, Milanowski (2004) 
observed correlations averaging around .30 between standardized teacher evaluations and 
student achievement scores on a standardized assessment. While the correlation is 
moderately positive, the sample of evaluators used in the research were trained in the use 
of a well-researched, standardized measure. Thus, the estimates from Milanowski’s 
research may be upper bound compared to estimates from educational settings in which 
evaluators use self-made measures. Lower estimates were obtained in earlier research in 
which the correlations between principal evaluations and student achievement on tests of 
math and reading were around .20 (Medley & Coker, 1987).  
Student-Teacher ratings. There is evidence that student-led evaluations of 
teacher quality are more reliable than principal evaluations (Peterson, Wahlquist, & 
Bone, 2000). That said, student evaluations have similar problems. Interrater reliability 
between single-students in the same class averages around .20 (Marsh, 1984), suggesting 
that there is significant variability in how individual students rate teachers. With 50 or 
more students, inter-rater reliability is reasonable high on average (r = .95), but most 
primary classrooms do not approach 50 students. At the university level, student level 
evaluations are common (Krautmann & Sander, 1999). University students are arguably 
better judges of teacher performance compared to students in primary grades given their 
additional years of educational experience. Yet, there is evidence suggesting that student 
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based evaluations of teachers at the university level reflect student grades and or course 
difficulty more-so than teacher quality (Krautmann & Sander, 1999; Centra, 2003), and 
are confounded with the gender of the instructor (Basow & Silberg, 1987). There is 
evidence that the quality of surveys results depends on the survey itself, the training 
students receive regarding the use of the survey, and the emphasis placed on the 
importance of the evaluation by the teacher under review (Marsh, 1984). A meta-analysis 
on the validity of student instructor ratings found a correlation of .43 between instructor 
ratings and student achievement (Cohen, 1981). This analysis suggests a moderate to 
strong relationship between student ratings and instructor quality, but as with the research 
summarized above, the effect of the relationship between teacher rating and student 
achievement was confounded with student grades. In sum, there is mixed evidence that, 
at the university level, student evaluations are useful yet imperfect predictors of teacher 
quality and survey results may be confounded with factors outside the control of the 
instructor. 
Less research has investigated the use of student led evaluations in primary 
grades. The research that has been conducted reports similarly mixed findings. 
Wilkerson, Manatt, Rogers, and Maughan (2000) reported strong correlations between 
student teacher evaluations and student achievement (r = .70). In their research, the 
correlation between student ratings and achievement was much higher than between 
principal ratings and student achievement (r = .15), confirming issues mentioned 
previously with regards to the accuracy of principal evaluations. Balch (2012) reported 
very different correlations. Balch reported a correlation of .30 between survey totals and 
student achievement for middle school and a correlation of .22 between survey totals and 
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student achievement for high school. Balch’s findings underscore a particular problem 
with the use of student teacher evaluations in primary grades in which there is a negative 
relationship between teacher ratings and grade level (Peterson et al., 2000). Speculating 
as to the wide discrepancy between the findings from the two studies summarized above 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but the range suggests that more research is needed.  
There are also concerns regarding the use of the use of surveys with elementary 
age children. Young children are still in the process of developing basic academic and 
cognitive skills and probably have less experience with surveys in general. Even so, there 
is evidence that 3rd graders prefer and understand Likert-Type items over visual analog 
scales (Laerhoven, van der Zaag-Loonen, & Derkx, 2004) and that 3rd graders respond to 
Likert-Type items similar to how children in older grades respond (Adelson & McCoach, 
2010). There is research suggesting that variation exists in the use of and interpretation of 
Likert-Type scales across cultural and ethnic groups (Bernal, Wooley, & Schensul, 
1997), which may cause problems for schools with diverse demographics.  
Composite Teacher Evaluation 
The research summarized above indicates that while both principal and student 
driven teacher evaluations are important sources of information about teacher quality, 
neither appear to be free of bias or accurate enough to be used as a sole indicator of 
teacher quality in high stakes scenarios. The evidence suggests that principal evaluations 
in particular are unreliable and subjective. Thus, there is support for an evaluative 
approach which combines different evaluative efforts into a composite framework (see 
Koretz, 2008). Value-added estimation plays a central role in a composite framework 
because unlike principal evaluations or student surveys, value-added models are tied 
50 
 
 
 
directly to student outcomes. The rational for combining multiple imperfect measures 
into a composite indicator is supported by research on testing and measurement in other 
fields. A composite measure was used by the United States Airforce to screen candidates 
as potential pilots (Guilford, 1946). Researchers found that the predictive validity of their 
measure could be improved by using a variety of subscales to screen candidates, 
including those subscales that were not strongly associated with the latent construct of 
interest. The take-away from this research is that the accuracy of high stakes decisions 
can be improved in small but important degrees by considering information from 
multiple, imperfect sources. 
Research into the construction, use, validity and accuracy of composite measures 
of teacher effectiveness combining value-added scores with other less formal methods of 
evaluation are still in the early stages (see Mihaly et al., 2013; Strunk et al., 2014). 
Regarding the issue of the perceived fairness of high-stakes evaluative systems, there is 
tentative evidence that composite measures are perceived by teachers in a more positive 
light (Balch & Koedel, 2014). With regards to the statistical problems, there is evidence 
from the MET project indicating that the accuracy of value-added scores might be 
improved when combined with subjective indexes of teacher quality (Kane, McCaffrey, 
Miller, & Staiger, 2013). The purpose of the MET project was to investigate whether a 
composite indicator of teacher quality could be used to predict a teacher’s impact on 
student test scores. To investigate this possibility, the researchers first estimated teacher 
quality in 2009 for a sample of elementary and middle school teachers across six school 
districts using a composite measure composed of three equally weighted dimensions: a 
value-added estimate, a student survey, and a standardized classroom observation. 
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Students were then randomly assigned to the sample of teachers in the following year. 
Estimates of teacher effectiveness were generated for the same sample of teachers in 
2010 using the same composite measure. The primary interest of the study was the 
relationship between the predicted student test scores generated in 2009 and the actual 
student test scores obtained in 2010. A strong relationship between the predicted test 
scores obtained under the non-random assignment of students to teachers and the actual 
test scores obtained under randomized conditions would speak to the predictive and 
ecological validity of the measurement. Kane et al. reported that a one unit change in a 
teacher’s predicted effectiveness resulted in a 1.039 unit change in actual student 
achievement in math. For English language arts, the reported change in actual 
achievement was .697. When math and English language arts were combined, the change 
in student growth corresponding to a one unit change in predicted teacher effectiveness 
was .955. These findings suggest that on average, the MET composite measure nearly 
predicted the impact of individual teachers on student growth. Furthermore, each 
individual measure of teacher quality was less strongly associated with student growth 
compared to the composite measure as a whole. The value-added estimate underestimated 
student growth (1.148), whereas the observation (.807) and the student survey (.940) 
overestimated student growth for the combined math and English Language arts score.  
Findings form the MET project formed the theoretical basis for the current study. 
The MET project demonstrated that a composite measure of teacher effectiveness could 
be used to predict the impact of a teacher on student growth. This is important because 
while researchers have been arguing for some time that value-added models should be 
combined with other indicators of teacher quality, the MET project was one of the first 
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large, well-funded studies to look at the problem empirically and in an applied setting. 
Other research on the topic has been conducted investigating the relationships between 
raw composite indicators (Grossman et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2011; Kane & Staiger; 2008, 
Strunk et al., 2014); this research was discussed in Chapter III where it was used to 
inform parametrization decisions, and methods for combining indicators through different 
weighting schemes (Mihaly et al., 2013). While the theoretical focus in recent research is 
important if composite measures are to be adapted for general usage, no known research 
has been conducted revisiting the estimation precision problem discovered by Schochet 
and Chiang (2010). Estimation precision currently limits the usefulness of value-added 
models for high stakes teacher evaluation. Schochet and Chiang found that 10 to 11 years 
of data would be needed to estimate teacher effects with a high degree of precision using 
a conventional value-added model. The MET project demonstrated that at least on 
average, a composite measure can be used to more accurately predict teacher impact on 
test scores.   
The purpose of the proposed study was to investigate whether a composite 
measure similar to the one used in the MET project could be used to reduce the number 
of years required to estimate teacher quality with a level of precision necessary for high 
stakes scenarios. This question has important implications regarding the improvement 
that can be expected when comparing value-added teacher evaluation to teacher 
evaluation based on composite approaches. 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
 The primary aim of the current study was to investigate the extent to which a 
composite measure of teacher effectiveness could be used to increase the precision of 
estimated teacher effects compared to estimates derived from a stand-alone value-added 
model. To that end, two studies discussed in Chapter II informed the approach and design 
outlined here in Chapter III. Schochet and Chiang (2010) simulated achievement data to 
investigate the precision of value-added effects using conventional value-added 
specifications. The current research design emulated the approach used by Schochet and 
Chiang in order to replicate their primary finding; the finding that approximately 10 to 11 
years of data are needed to estimate teacher effects under type I and type II error rates 
commonly used in scientific research. For this reason, the methods reported here are 
adapted from Schochet and Chiang’s simulation design. Modifications to Schochet and 
Chiang’s design were made to allow for comparisons between a value-added and a 
composite specification of teacher effectiveness. The goal was to investigate whether the 
use of a composite measure of teacher effectiveness, such as the one used in the MET 
project (Kane et al., 2013), produced comparatively fewer classification errors in a 
shorter time frame. Kane et al. (2013) demonstrated that their composite measure of 
teacher effectiveness more accurately predicted student achievement, on average. 
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However, in order for estimates of teacher effectiveness to be used effectively and fairly 
high-stakes decisions, estimates must be accurate for individual teachers. The question of 
whether or not a composite measure produces more precise estimates for individuals (and 
not just on average) was not addressed in the MET project and was discussed as a 
limitation. The proposed study seeks to investigate the possibility that a composite 
indicator of teacher effectiveness might improve precision of estimates of teacher 
effectiveness for individual teachers. 
Appropriateness of the  
Research Design 
 
The MET study was a large, well-funded study. The researchers were given 
access to public schools and were allowed to randomize the assignment of students to 
teachers and teachers to students. This was a rare opportunity that required large scale 
coordination between researchers, administrators, teachers, parents and students. While a 
research design with similar ecological validity and scale would be ideal for the current 
research, the reality was that available resources for the current research were inadequate 
to replicate the MET project on even a small scale. Instead of trying to replicate the MET 
project, the current study was a Monte Carlo Simulation. Student growth data were 
simulated, and two evaluation models, a value-added model and a composite measure, 
were fit to the data in order to estimate teacher effectiveness. Type-I and type-II error 
rates were used to compare precision. 
While simulation research has less ecological validity compared to applied 
research, simulation research has distinct advantages. The strength of simulation research 
lies in the fact that population properties can be manipulated to investigate a range of 
plausible scenarios in applied settings. In applied research, there is generally some 
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population value or values of interest not known to the researcher. Population values are 
estimated from a sample using statistical methods. The accuracy or appropriateness with 
which desired population quantities are estimated can be difficult to determine without 
knowing population values beforehand. Under simulated conditions, estimated values for 
population parameters can be compared against known values for population parameters. 
Consequently, simulation research is useful for testing statistical methodology under 
varying conditions, constraints and limitations. For example, in Maas and Hox (2005) 
simulated hierarchical data in which they manipulated the size of different clusters and 
the number of observations within each cluster to investigate power associated with 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). This allowed Maas and Hox to make general 
recommendations about sample size and power requirements for HLM research. With 
regards to the current study, varying conditions were manipulated representing a variety 
of educational contexts. Applied research was used to inform realistic parameterization. 
The proposed design allowed for observations to be made regarding the possible range 
with which a composite measure improves on the precision of teacher effects over stand-
alone value-added estimates depending on educational contexts.   
Organization 
In general, the goal for a simulation design is to produce data similar to data 
found in research and applied scenarios. Simulating perfectly realistic data is difficult and 
often not possible due to the complexity of realistic data. Additionally, in a single study, 
it is necessary to limit the investigative scope to a few practical considerations. Thus for 
purposes of replicability, generalizability and critical review, designing and reporting 
simulation based research requires rigor comparable to that of conventional research 
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designs. Burton, Altman, Royston and Holder (2006) discussed a list of elements needed 
for conducting and reporting on simulation research. These elements are summarized 
here with the intention of providing an organizational framework for the methods 
presented in Chapter III. 
1) Aims and objectives should be specified for clarity and to ensure unique 
contributions to scholarship 
2) For purposes of replicability, software, versions and seed values should be 
detailed 
3) Simulation procedures should be explained. The number of replications should be 
discussed and as well as methods for comparing simulation fidelity across 
independently generated data sets.  
4) Justification should be discussed regarding choices driving parameterization. 
Realistic data are the goal, so choices made by the researcher should reflect that 
goal. Arbitrary parameterization has the potential to limit generalizability of 
results. 
5) Scenarios for investigation should be discussed. Possible scenarios for 
investigation include sample size, omitted variables, etc. 
6) Criteria for making methodological comparisons should be discussed. Where 
possible, multiple criteria should be used. 
7) Methods for collecting and storing estimates should be discussed. Simulation 
research often involves thousands of replications. Extraction and storage of 
estimates must be automated, otherwise simulation research would not be 
practical. 
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Simulation Procedure 
Software 
The simulation was written in R version 3.2.2. R-studio version 0.99.484, an 
integrated development environment (IDE), was also used at all stages of development. 
An IDE is a development tool which combines many useful functions for coding and 
debugging. R is an open-source programming language widely used for statistical 
applications operated using a command line console (R Core Team, 2014). A basic 
installation of R provides access to a host of built-in functions, scripts used to perform 
computations on a set of arguments. R base functionality can be expanded by installing 
open source packages. Packages are available to download from the Comprehensive R 
Archive Network (CRAN). For this simulation, the package MASS version 7.3-37 was 
used to generate multivariate normal distributions with known covariance structures. The 
package lme4 version 1.1-7 was used to fit an HLM model to the data. A seed value of 
456 will be used. 
Data Simulation 
For purposes of replicability and because simulation research requires the use of 
simplifying assumptions, it is important that details are specified regarding the simulation 
of data (Burton et al., 2006). For the current study, simulated data were meant to 
represent student gain scores across two consecutive standardized assessments which are 
perfectly vertically aligned. Value-added effects were computed by fitting a hierarchichal 
linear model (HLM) to the simulated data. Principal observation ratings and student-
teacher evaluations were simulated, and composite scores for individual teachers was 
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computed by averaging across composite variables. Details regarding simulation process 
and assumptions used to guide the process are discussed below. 
Generating distributions of teacher evaluation variables. For convenience, the 
simulation procedure is illustrated in Appendix A. The first stage in the simulation 
involved generating distributions for value-added scores, teacher observational ratings 
and student-teacher evaluations. Distributions of teacher evaluation variables were 
assumed to be standard normal. A congeneric factor structure was used to generate 
indicator variables. It was assumed that the three variables loaded onto a single factor 
representing teacher quality or effectiveness. This assumption was supported by recent 
research which indicated that different indicators of teacher quality assess some 
overlapping and some unique variance in teacher quality (Strunk et al., 2014). The factor 
model was specified as: 
𝑥𝑥 = Λ𝑓𝑓 + 𝑒𝑒 
where 𝑥𝑥 represented observed scores on the three variables, Λ represented a vector of 
factor loadings between the three variables and teacher quality, 𝑓𝑓 represented a vector of 
iid ~ N(0, 1) latent factor scores, and e represented a matrix of independently distributed 
measurement errors.  
 Factor loadings were determined a priori by relying on research which 
investigated the relationships between the three teacher evaluation variables. Choices and 
rational regarding parameterization were discussed in proceeding sections. x was created 
by randomly generating a multivariate normal distribution with the specified correlation 
structure. Multivariate distributions were generated using the mvrnorm function in r. 
Once generated, 𝑥𝑥 was a N x 3 matrix in which columns represented evaluation variables, 
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and N was the number of teachers in the data set. The three variables were designated as 
𝑓𝑓1, 𝑓𝑓2 and 𝑓𝑓3. 𝑓𝑓1 was used to represent teachers’ true contribution to student learning 
(value-added), 𝑓𝑓2 represented the distribution of true scores from principal evaluations, 
and 𝑓𝑓3 represented the distribution of true scores for student-teacher evaluations. For the 
current study, error was generated as the unique proportion of variance at different levels 
within the data (student-level, teacher-level, etc.). This process was discussed in detail 
below. Because error was introduced later in the simulation process, 𝑒𝑒 was set to zero 
such that the distribution 𝑥𝑥 represented true variation in the composite outcome. 
Generating gain scores. Student gain scores were generated using the 
hierarchical population model used by Schochet and Chiang (2010). The purpose of using 
a modified version of Schochet and Chiang’s design was to replicate their finding that 
several years of data would be needed to estimate teacher effects with adequate levels of 
precision. Schochet and Chiang generated achievement data using a four-level 
hierarchical framework: 
Level 1: Student:  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Level 2: Class: 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Level 3: Teacher: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Level 4: Schools: 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖  
Student growth was represented by the gain score 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for student i, in class t, by teacher 
j, in school k. 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 are random intercepts. 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the average gain score for 
a student within a given class, teacher and school. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the iid ~  N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀) random 
error term representing individual student deviations from 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the average 
student growth for a given teacher within a school. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃) deviation 
60 
 
 
 
of teacher j from average student achievement within school k. 𝛿𝛿 was average student 
achievement across schools, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓) was the deviation from the average 
for school k. The population model is more simply expressed in a single combined 
equation where student gain is modeled as average student gain plus the combined 
deviations from the mean across each school, teacher, class and student: 
Combined:  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 +  (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
The interpretation of the combined model is that student gains are the sum of the fixed 
effect 𝛿𝛿, representing average student gain within a district, and four random effects 
representing deviations from the norm at the school, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, teacher, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, class, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 
student, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, levels  
Simulating data using the model above involved three steps. First 𝛿𝛿 was set to 
zero. Using zero for average student gains allowed for easy interpretation. Values 
generated above zero represented student gains above the average and values generated 
below zero represented student gains below the average. Next, independent normal 
distributions were generated for 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The function rnorm in r was used for 
this purpose. rnorm generates random normal distributions of a given mean and standard 
deviation as specified by the user. Variances 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀,  𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔, and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 were set to the same 
values used by Schochet and Chiang. Schochet and Chiang reviewed research within the 
last ten years to determine realistic proportions of variance in student gains at student, 
class, teacher and school levels. The specific values of 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀,  𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔, and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 were 
discussed in the section on parameterization. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was generated in the prior step. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
analogous to 𝑓𝑓1 and represented the deviation from the average gain score for students 
belonging to teacher j within school k. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be thought of as the teacher’s contributions 
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to student growth (value-added). Generating 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the prior step was necessary because it 
allowed for the distribution of teacher value-added scores to be correlated with the other 
teacher evaluation variables. The variance of 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃, was rescaled to match the 
parameterization used by Schochet and Chiang. Once the distributions for all of the 
random effects were generated, student gain scores were generated by simply finding the 
sum of the scalar value 𝛿𝛿 and the vectors 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
Several assumptions were made for purposes of simplicity. The same assumptions 
were made by Schochet and Chiang. The number of students within each classroom was 
assumed to be the same across teachers. It was assumed that there was no teacher 
mobility between schools. It was assumed that achievement measurement were perfectly 
scaled across grades allowing for comparisons of teachers at different grade levels. 
Finally, it was assumed that students were randomly assigned to schools and to teachers. 
Due to the fact that these assumptions are simplifications, results from the current study 
were interpreted as best case. Contextually, this meant that the expected accuracy of 
classification rates is likely worse in applied settings compared to the results derived 
from the current study. 
Generating principal observation scores. Principal observation scores were 
generated using a similar hierarchical model. There were only two levels are relevant to 
principal evaluations scores: 
Level 1: Teacher: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Level 2: Schools: 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖  
While variation in principle evaluation scores exists between classes taught by the same 
teacher, between teachers, and between principals, it was assumed that principal 
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evaluations are not generally averaged across classes taught by the same teacher. For this 
reason, principal evaluation scores were generated using the teacher level as the lowest 
level of analysis. Note that the same multilevel notation used in the previous section is 
used here to avoid using overly complicated notation. With regards to principal 
evaluations scores, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was interpreted as an evaluation score for teacher j at school k. 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 
was the average evaluation score for teachers at school k. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the deviation from the 
average for teacher j at school k and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃). 𝛿𝛿 was the district 
average and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 was the deviation from the district average assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 
𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓). 
The distribution 𝑓𝑓2, generated in the previous step, was rescaled and used as 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
For easy interpretation 𝛿𝛿 and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 were set to zero. This will mean that scores above or 
below zero represented principal evaluation scores above or below the average. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖were generated as normal distributions with variance components 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓. The 
parameterization of 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 was discussed in a section below. Principal evaluation 
scores for teacher j within school k can be modeled using the combined formula: 
Combined:  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) 
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was generated as the sum of the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖.  
Generating student-teacher evaluation scores. Student-teacher evaluation 
scores were generated using the same four-level population model used to generate 
student gains scores: 
 
Level 1: Student:  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Level 2: Class: 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
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Level 3: Teacher: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Level 4: Schools: 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖  
Again, for purposes of simple notation, the notation used here is identical to the notation 
used above. 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the evaluation score given by student i within class t for 
teacher j within school k. 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the average evaluation given by class t for teacher j 
within school k. 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the average evaluation given to teacher j across 1…t classes, and 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 was the average evaluation given by students to teachers within school k. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 were random terms. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the deviation from the average student 
evaluation 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for student i and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀). 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the 
deviation from the average evaluation given to teacher j for class t and was assumed to be 
iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔) . 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represented the deviation from the average evaluation given to 
teachers within school k and was assumed to be iid ~  N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃). Finally, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖  was the 
deviation from the district average for school k and was assumed to be iid ~ N(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓). 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the deviation from average student-teacher evaluation scores within a school, was 
equivalent to 𝑓𝑓3, generated in the previous step. 𝑓𝑓3 was used for 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 but was rescaled such 
that the ratio between the variance of random terms (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖) was 
equivalent to the ratio discussed in the section below. 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was generated as the sum of 
the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖: 
Combined: 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 +  (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
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Parameterization  
In simulation research, choices must be made with regards to the parametrization 
of known population values. Parameters are characteristics of a population which are 
estimated in applied research. Regression coefficients, for example, are parameters 
representing relationships between variables in a research sample. In simulation research, 
values for population parameters are determined by the researcher. Sample data are 
generated using these known population parameters and statistical methods are applied to 
generated data sets in order to attempt to recover known population parameters. By using 
different methods with the same sampled data sets, researchers can draw conclusions 
about the relative effectiveness of different methods under varying data conditions. 
Conditions are used in simulation research to compare the use of statistical 
methods across a variety possible settings in applied research. Conditions used to 
compare methods vary across simulation studies. Simulation research has been used to 
investigate variation in sample size (Mass & Hox, 2005), violations of normality 
assumptions (Mass & Hox, 2004), and the impact of missing data on estimated 
parameters (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). Varying parameters and data conditions allows for 
the investigation of a range of plausible scenarios relevant to applied problems. 
Conditions and parameterization for the proposed study were discussed in the following 
section. For convenience, a summary of the proposed conditions is reported below in 
Table 1. Methods used to compare conditions were discussed in a subsequent section. 
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Table 1 
 
Simulated Conditions 
Condition Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Sample size    
Number of teachers within a sample 4 12 --- 
Number of schools within a district 10 50 --- 
Alpha level 
Factor loadings 
.01 .05 .10 
𝑓𝑓1  0 .37 .84 
𝑓𝑓2  0 .27 .62 
𝑓𝑓3  0 .59 .84 
Evaluation scheme Within Between --- 
Note. All conditions are fully crossed resulting in 72 total conditions  
 
Parameterization for Teacher  
Evaluation Distributions 
 
The first class of parameters used in the current study were the factor loadings 
between teacher effectiveness, the latent characteristic of interest, and the three teacher 
evaluation distributions 𝑓𝑓1, 𝑓𝑓2, and 𝑓𝑓3. Values for factor loadings were determined by 
reviewing recent research on the relationship between teacher evaluation variables (see 
Grossman et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2012; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008; Kane et al., 2013; 
Milanowski, 2004; Wilkerson et al., 2000). In recent research, correlations ranging from 
.10 to .52 were reported between various principal evaluation measures and value-added 
scores. Correlations ranging from .22 to .70 were reported between student-teacher 
evaluations and value-added scores. Correlations ranging from .16 to .52 were reported 
between principal and student-teacher evaluations. Note that highly standardized 
observational measures were used across the research reviewed, and in some cases, raters 
were given training in their use prior to data collection. It was assumed that there is 
substantial variation in practice regarding the quality of the rating instrument used for 
teacher evaluation. For this reason, a range of correlations will be used in the proposed 
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study in order to investigate a range of plausible correlations between teacher evaluation 
variables which depend on the quality of the observational scheme.  
Three conditions were used in the current study. In the first condition, the 
correlation between composite indicators was set to zero. In the second condition, lower 
bound estimates of the inter-correlations determined factor loadings. Factor loadings 
were set to .37, .27 and .59 for 𝑓𝑓1, 𝑓𝑓2, and 𝑓𝑓3 respectively. In the third condition, upper 
bound estimates of the inter-correlations were used to determine factor loadings. In this 
third condition, factor loadings were set to .84, .62, and .84 for 𝑓𝑓1, 𝑓𝑓2, and 𝑓𝑓3.     
Parameterization of  
Student-Gain  
Scores 
 
The second class of parameters used in the current study were the distributions of 
the random components. The ratio of the variance between random components 
influences estimation precision. For example, the precision of the estimated teacher 
value-added scores, ?̂?𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  decreases as the magnitude of the variation in student gain 
scores between students, 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀, increases relative to the total variation in student gain 
scores. With regards to the generation of value-added scores, 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀 represented variation in 
student gain scores between students, 𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔 represented variation in student gain scores 
between classes taught by the same teacher, 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃, represented variation in student gain 
scores between teachers, and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 represented variation in student gain scores between 
schools in the same district. Total variation in gain scores was the sum of the four 
variance components: 
Total variation:  𝜎𝜎2 = 𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓  
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The ratio between variance components is expressed as an intra-class correlation (ICC). 
An ICC is a ratio comparing outcome variance at a single level of analysis to the total 
outcome variation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002): 
ICC:  𝜌𝜌� = 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙
  
ICCs are a useful way to express the percentage of outcome variation existing at each 
level within the data. With regards to student gain scores, there were four ICCs, one for 
each level within the data. These ICCs represented the percentage of variation in student 
gain scores existing at the student, classroom, teacher and school levels respectively: 
Level 1: Student:   𝜌𝜌�𝜀𝜀 =  𝜎𝜎2𝜀𝜀𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  
Level 2: Class:  𝜌𝜌�𝜔𝜔 = 𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  
Level 3: Teacher: 𝜌𝜌�𝜃𝜃 = 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  
Level 4: Schools: 𝜌𝜌�𝜓𝜓 = 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙  
Schochet and Chiang reviewed research from the last ten years to in order to determine 
realistic ICCs to use when generating student gain scores. The current study used the 
values chosen by Schochet and Chiang in order to reproduce their key findings and to 
ensure that realistic parameters were in the generation process. Schochet and Chiang 
found that the greatest amount of variation in student gain scores existed at the student 
level (𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀 = .92). Less variation was observed at the class level (𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔 = .03), the teacher 
level (𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃 = .035), and at the school level (𝜌𝜌𝜓𝜓 =  .011). There is consensus among 
researchers that variation in student growth is explained primarily by differences between 
students (Harris, 2011). This is the chief reason for why large sample sizes are needed to 
estimate variation in student growth at teacher or school levels. The ICCs specified above 
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were used to proportion variance in student gain scores across student, class, teacher and 
school levels. 
Parameterization of Principal  
Evaluation Scores 
 
Principal evaluations scores were generated using a two-level model. The ratio 
between random variance terms 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 and  𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 represented the ratio of variance in 
principal evaluation scores existing between teachers and between principals. In order to 
generate realistic principal evaluation data, this ratio needed to reflect values observed in 
practice. While recent research has been conducted investigating several facets of 
principal evaluations (e.g., reliability, relation to other teacher evaluation methods), only 
one study was found that considered variability in principal evaluations both between and 
within principals. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) asked whether principal evaluations could be 
used to identify effective teachers. They collected principal evaluation data using a self-
authored rating scale and compared teacher ratings to value-added scores. Mean centered 
evaluation scores were roughly normally distributed with a standard deviation of 1.36. 
Unfortunately, specific figures were not provided detailing heterogeneity across 
principals. They did mention that while “…there was some heterogeneity across 
principals, the ratings are generally high,” indicating that a greater amount of variation in 
principle evaluation scores existed within than between principals. This observation is 
consistent with the work of Tucker (1997), who dubbed the tendency among principals to 
rate teachers above average as the “Lake Wobegon Effect.”  
Given the lack of precise estimates for the variability in principal evaluation 
scores existing between and within principals, a rough guess was used for the current 
study. The guiding assumption was that a greater amount of variation existed within than 
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between principals. Thus, .75 was used for the estimated ratio between 𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 and 𝜎𝜎2𝜓𝜓 (i.e., 
𝜎𝜎2𝜃𝜃 accounted for 75 percent of the total variation in principal evaluation scores).  
Parameterization of Student  
Teacher Evaluation Scores 
 
No known research has compared variation in student-teacher evaluations across 
educational levels in primary grades. For this reason, it was difficult to determine realistic 
parametrization for generating student-teacher evaluation scores. Variation parameters 
used to generate student gain scores were used as rough approximations of the variation 
in student-evaluation scores across student, class, teacher and school levels. Because so 
much variation in student gain scores existed at the student level, this rough 
approximation for student-teacher evaluation scores served as a worst case scenario. 
Thus, the values for the variation parameters used in the current study to generate 
student-teacher evaluation scores was 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀 = .92 at the student level, 𝜌𝜌𝜔𝜔 = .03 at the class 
level, 𝜌𝜌𝜃𝜃 = .035 at the teacher level, and 𝜌𝜌𝜓𝜓 =  .011 and the school level. 
Sample Size 
Sample size played an important role in the current study. The number of students 
per class, n, the number of teachers per schools, j, and the number of schools per district, 
k, influences estimated precision. Schochet and Chiang used survey data from 2004 to 
choose realistic values for the number of students, teachers and schools when generating 
data. Values more representative of Colorado schools were used in the current study. 
According to the National Center for Educational statistics (2008), the median class size 
for elementary teachers teaching in self-contained classes in Colorado is 21.2. This value 
was rounded down such that 21 was be used for n. The number of teachers who can be 
evaluated within a school depends on the earliest grade in which standardized assessment 
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is given to students. According to the Colorado Department of Education (2015), the 
PARCC assessment will be administered to students beginning in the 3rd grade. If 
assuming that most elementary schools include a sixth grade, this means teachers from 
the 4th, 5th and 6th grades can be evaluated using student achievement growth. According 
to the National Center for Educational Statistics (2000), the average elementary school 
size in Colorado is 386. Assuming there are roughly 21 students per teacher, this means 
that the average school in Colorado has 18.4 teachers. When divided across grades, there 
are 2.62 teachers per grade. Based on these figures, the number of teachers per school, j, 
was set to 8 for an average school to fit the assumption of assessing three grades. To 
investigate precision for both small and for large schools, j was set to values of 4 and 12. 
The number of schools per districts varies widely across Colorado districts. To 
investigate estimated precision across small and large districts k was set to values of 10 
and 50. 
Estimating Parameters 
Once data have been generated, the next step in a typical methodological 
simulation is to model the data using statistical methods of interest. The difference 
between estimated and known population parameters allows for inferences about the 
accuracy and bias of different statistical procedures under varying data conditions. The 
primary methodological comparison for the current study was between teacher estimates 
derived from a stand-alone value-added model and a composite measure. Relative 
precision of the two approaches was compared.  
Two schemes for evaluating teachers were used to determine teacher evaluations 
across both methodological approaches. These were the same two schemes used by 
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Schochet and Chiang. In the first scheme, teachers were evaluated within schools. When 
comparing teachers within schools, variation between schools is ignored. Some have 
argued that this approach is generally more fair as teachers are less likely to be held 
accountable for instructional and contextual differences between schools which influence 
student outcomes (Ladd, 2008; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). On the other hand, 
sample size is a limitation which makes comparisons within schools more difficult. 
Therefore, comparisons of teachers between schools is common in practice. Estimation 
methods was crossed with evaluative schemes. Teacher effectiveness was estimated 
within and between schools using value-added scores and composite scores. Refer to 
Table 1 for an overview of the conditions for the proposed study. 
Method 1: Estimating Teacher  
Effectiveness Using  
Value-Added Scores 
 
The teacher value-added effect was 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was average gain score for students 
belonging to teacher j within school k and can be expressed in the following combined 
equation: 
Value-added between schools: ?̂?𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖)  
When comparing teachers between schools, the parameter used to estimate 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the 
sum of  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was the deviation from the average student gain score for teacher 
j within school k, and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 was the deviation from the average student gain score for 
school k. When comparing teachers within a school, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 can be ignored because there is 
only one school, and there is no need to account for variation in student gain scores 
between schools. The equation for comparing teachers within schools can be expressed 
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more simply as ?̂?𝜏𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 .  The parameter used to estimate 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 was 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , which simply 
represented deviation from the average student gains within a school for teacher j.  
Once data were generated, a hierarchical linear model (HLM) was fit to the data 
in order to estimate the parameters described above. Specifically, an HLM was fit in 
order to estimate the fixed effect 𝛿𝛿 and the random effects 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 necessary for 
computing teacher value-added scores across the two evaluative schemes. The HLM 
described here is a general model used in practice to estimate teacher value-added effects. 
Specification of more complex models is possible (see McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, 
Louis, & Hamilton, 2004), but the current model served as a baseline for assessing the 
research goals. Below, HLM models are specified with regards to the two evaluative 
schemes: 
Value-added between schools: 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 +  (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Value-added within schools:  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
A single level linear regression only allows for the estimation of a single random term. If 
a single level linear regression were fit to the data, variation in gain scores at the class 
level, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the teacher level 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and at the school level, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, would be lumped into the 
single random term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. A detailed description of HLM is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For a detailed coverage see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). For purposes of the 
current study, the advantage of using HLM to estimate teacher effects was that HLM 
allowed for the separate estimation of variation at different levels within the data. The 
random effect 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  was isolated for comparing teachers within a school, and the sum of 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 was isolated for comparing teachers between schools. This would not have been  
possible using conventional regression models. 
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Method 2: Estimating Teacher  
Effectiveness Using a  
Composite Measure 
 
Estimating teacher effectiveness using a composite measure involved an 
additional step. Value-added scores were estimated for comparing teachers within and 
between schools using the procedure outline in the preceding section. Value-added scores 
were combined with principal evaluation scores and student-teacher evaluation scores. It 
was assumed that raw scores are frequently used in practice when evaluating teachers 
using either principal evaluations or student-teacher evaluations. For this reason, a HLM 
was not fit to the generated principal evaluation data or the student-teacher evaluation 
data. The average of the raw scores for both the principal evaluations and for the student-
teacher evaluations was standardized and used as estimates of teacher effectiveness: 
Within schools: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝜏𝜏.𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃  
Between schools: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−𝜏𝜏..𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓  
Using the estimates above, composite scores for each teacher were computed as the linear 
sum of the three evaluation variables. Note that no weights were used in the linear sum. 
Prior research has shown that value-added estimates and subjective teacher evaluations 
measure different aspects of teacher effectiveness and that equal weighting is optimal if 
the goal is to estimate more than just the effect of the teacher on achievement scores 
(Mihaly et al, 2013). Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus on how to weight different 
indicators of teacher effectiveness within a composite measure (Hanover, 2013).  
Methodological Comparisons 
The primary interest of the current study involved the comparative precision of 
estimates derived from a stand-alone value added model and a composite measure fit to 
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the same data. To get at this, the precision of the two approaches was compared using the 
same generated data. Precision was computed for the null hypothesis that each teacher 
was significantly different than the school or district average (depending evaluation 
scheme) with regards to student gains or with regards to the composite outcome. Using 
cutoff values discussed below, type I and type II error rates were computed for each 
method and compared. 
Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis that was tested for each teacher is analogous to a z-test in which a 
z-scores is computed as the difference between two means divided by an estimate of the 
standard error: 
𝑧𝑧 = ?̅?𝑥1 − ?̅?𝑥2
𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒
 
Z-scores are often used to test the hypothesis that an observed value is different than zero 
or some other value of interest. In the context of the current study, conceptually, these z-
scores were meant to test whether a teacher was significantly different with regards to 
average student gains or with regards to the average composite outcome.  
The z-score equation specified above is general and was further specified for the 
current study. When comparing teachers within schools, ?̅?𝑥1 is equivalent to 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (average 
student growth for students belonging to teacher  j within school k). The test case ?̅?𝑥2 is 
equivalent to 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖, average student growth within school k. Using this notation the null 
hypothesis states that 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is not different than 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖: 
𝐻𝐻0: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖 = 0 
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The null hypothesis was tested against the alternative that average student growth for 
teacher j is different than the average student growth within school k: 
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0 
The formula for standard error was slightly more complicated due to the fact that the data 
were generated using a clustered design. Within an HLM framework, fixed effects can be 
estimated using traditional ordinary least squares regression (OLS), but often, they are 
estimated using the Empirical Bayes (EB) method. This is mentioned here because the 
computation of standard errors depends on the estimation method. A technical description 
of EB estimation is beyond the scope of the current paper (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002), but the basic concept is explained. The advantage of EB estimation over more 
traditional ordinary least squares estimation is that estimates with poor reliability are 
“shrunk” to the grand mean. Shrinkage reduces sampling error in a clustered design when 
sample size for certain clusters is low. The advantage from a policy perspective is that 
estimates for individual teachers are more conservative, especially when there are not 
many students in a classroom. Conservative estimation in value-added contexts means 
that type-I errors are controlled but at the cost of increased type-II errors. In other words, 
when using EB estimation, fewer teachers are expected to be incorrectly identified as 
significantly above or below the average, but a greater number of teachers significantly 
above or below the average are expected to be incorrectly identified as average. Schochet 
and Chiang compared type-I and type-II error rates using both OLS and EB estimation. 
OLS estimation were used for the current study because OLS estimation provided a more 
direct method for combining value-added scores into a composite measure of teacher 
effectiveness. 
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Schochet and Chiang used the following formula to estimate standard errors for a 
clustered design: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ��𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎2𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 � (𝑚𝑚− 1𝑚𝑚 ) 
Here 𝑐𝑐 is the number of years included in the analysis (or number of classes per teacher), 
n is the number of students per class per teacher, and m is the number of teachers per 
school.  𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔 and 𝜎𝜎2𝑒𝑒 have the same interpretation as before and are the variation in 
student growth at the class and student levels respectively. Thus, individual z-scores for 
comparing the null and alternative hypotheses were computed using the following 
formula: 
𝑧𝑧𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖)𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The scheme to compare teachers across schools was slightly different. Average growth 
for teacher j within school k was compared against the average growth within a district: 
𝐻𝐻0: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏.. = 0 
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏.. ≠ 0 
𝜏𝜏.. was used to designate average student growth within a district. The formula for the z-
score was as follows: 
𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏..)𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 
where: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 =  ��𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎2𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 � (𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 − 1𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 ) 
Here s stood for the number of schools in the group to be compared. 
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Methodologically, the current study deviated from the study by Schochet and 
Chiang in that the current study included two conditions, one in which teacher 
effectiveness was estimated using value-added scores and one in which teacher 
effectiveness was estimated using a composite measure. The methods described above 
were used to compute z-scores for the value-added model.  
When comparing teachers within school using the composite measure, the null 
hypothesis is the presumption that the composite score for teacher j within school k is not 
different than the average composite score for a teacher within school k. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the composite score for teacher j within school k is different than the 
average composite score within school k: 
𝐻𝐻0: 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 0 
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≠ 0 
The hypotheses was tested using the following z-score formula: 
𝑧𝑧𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) − (𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗)𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 are the raw scores for the teacher and student-teacher evaluation scores 
respectively, and 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and 𝜏𝜏.𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 are the average teacher and student-teacher evaluation 
scores within school k. 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a pooled standard deviation for the composite scores. 
To estimate the standard error for the composite measure, the Satterthwaite 
Approximation was used. The Satterhwaite Approximation is a method for pooling 
standard errors across variables with unequal variance. The following formula was used 
to compute z-scores for comparing teachers within schools: 
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𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ��𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎2𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 (𝑚𝑚− 1𝑚𝑚 )� + �𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚 � + �𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚 � 
The first bracketed term is the standard error of the value-added estimate. The second and 
third terms are the standard errors of the principal evaluations and student-teacher 
evaluations respectively. The following hypotheses were tested when comparing teachers 
across schools using the composite measure: 
𝐻𝐻0: 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 0 
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≠ 0 
𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the average composite score for teachers across the district. Z-scores were 
computed using the following formula:  
𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) − (𝜏𝜏.. + 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐 + 𝜏𝜏..𝑗𝑗)𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  
Here 𝜏𝜏.. is the average student growth for all teachers across a district, 𝜏𝜏..𝑐𝑐 is the average 
principal evaluation for all teachers across a district, and 𝜏𝜏..𝑗𝑗 is the average student 
evaluation for all teachers across a district. The following formula was used to compute 
standard errors for composite between schools measure: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = ��𝜎𝜎2𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝜎𝜎2𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 (𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 − 1𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 )� + �𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 � + �𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 � 
Error Rates 
Type I error rates were computed to determine the precision of the two methods. 
The following methods for computing error rates mirror the methods used by Schochet 
and Chiang. In the context of current study, a type-I error is a false positive with regards 
to two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, a type-I error is when an above average 
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teacher is incorrectly classified as significantly below average and in need of special 
assistance. In the second scenario, a false-positive is when a teacher who is below 
average is incorrectly classified as significantly above average. False positives have both 
ethical and financial consequences in evaluative contexts. Resources are wasted on 
teachers incorrectly identified as needing assistance or remediation, and there is the 
ethical concern associated with labeling above average teachers as underperforming.  
The assumption was made that the probability of a teacher q standard deviations 
above the average being classified as below average is the same as a teacher q standard 
deviations below the average being classified as above average. For this reason, error 
rates were computed for one-tailed tests. As a teacher’s true-value added moves away 
from average, the probability of a false-positive decreases. The probability of incorrectly 
classifying a truly average teacher as above or below average is equal to the type-I error 
rate 𝛼𝛼. Error rates using three different alpha values (.01, .05 and .10) were compared as a 
methodological condition. Schochet and Chiang used the following formula to compute 
the false-positive rate for any teacher q standard deviations (in gain score units) away 
from the mean: 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞) = 1 −  𝜙𝜙(𝜙𝜙−1(1 −  𝛼𝛼) + 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸
 
Here 𝜙𝜙 is the standard normal function, 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation for the population 
distribution of gain scores (𝜎𝜎 = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 + 𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔 + 𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃 + 𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓), and 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 is a distribution specific 
standard error. When computing the false-positive rate for value-added scores, 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 was 
equal to 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 or 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 depending on which scheme was being used 
(comparing teachers between or within schools). When computing the false-positive rate 
for the composite measure, 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 was equal to 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 or 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖. The 
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overall false-positive rate was computed representing the average false-positive rate for a 
distribution of teachers q standard deviations above average. Using a standard deviation 
of 𝜎𝜎𝑞𝑞 = 𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎  (the assumed standard deviation of teacher value-added effects within 
schools) for q when comparing teachers within-schools and a standard deviation of 𝜎𝜎𝑞𝑞 =
𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃+𝜎𝜎𝜓𝜓
𝜎𝜎
 (the assumed standard-deviation of teacher value-added effects between schools) 
for q when comparing teachers between schools, the overall false-positive rate was 
simulated by generating 1000 values for q where q > 0, by computing the false-positive 
rate for each draw, and by averaging across false-positive rates. To compute the overall-
false positive rate for composite scores the same procedure was used except that q was 
generated using the standard deviation of the composite scores.  
Type-II error rates were also used to compare the precision of the two methods. A 
type-II error is a false-negative in which a teacher below average is incorrectly identified 
as average. Type-II errors are arguably a more significant problem if assuming a central 
goal of value-added evaluation is to identify and remove underperforming teachers (see 
Hanushek, 2009). By replacing underperforming teachers with average teachers, 
Hanushek argued that long-term student gains could be improved dramatically, but such a 
scheme depends heavily on the accuracy with which underperforming teachers are 
identified. Schochet and Chiang computed false-negative rates for teachers q standard 
deviations below a performance threshold T:  
𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞) = 𝜙𝜙(𝜙𝜙−1(1 −  𝛼𝛼) + 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸
 
Overall false-negative rates for a population of teachers q standard deviations below 
performance threshold T were computed by generating 1000 values for q in which q < T, 
by computing the false negative rate for each draw of q, and by averaging across false-
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negative rates. The type-II error rate was equal to (1- 𝛽𝛽) where 𝛽𝛽 was the statistical 
power. 𝛽𝛽 can be interpreted as the percentage of time a significant difference will be 
observed when comparing teachers who are different by a magnitude of T minus the 
average in gain score units. 
Schochet and Chiang determined that a .2 standard deviation change in student 
gain scores corresponded to a .932 standard deviation increase in teacher-value added. 
Using the assumed distribution of value-added effects, a .932 increase in value-added is 
analogous to the difference between a teacher who contributed to student learning at the 
50th percentile and a teacher who contributed at the 82nd percentile (or the 18th percentile). 
Because Hanushek argued that teachers in the 10th percentile should be identified and 
replaced, the current study used a slightly different performance threshold T than was 
used by Schochet and Chiang. A threshold value of .275 was used for the current study. 
A difference of .275 standard deviations in student gain scores between teachers is equal 
to a 1.28 standard deviation difference between teacher effects. A difference of 1.28 
standard deviations between teacher effects is analogous to the difference between a 
teacher in the 50th percentile and a teacher in the 10th percentile with regards to student 
gains.  
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
Overview 
 
 In total, there were 72 fully crossed conditions. Conditions included in this 
simulation included varying number of teachers per school, varying number of schools 
per district, varying evaluation schemes (i.e., within or between school teacher 
comparisons), varying correlations between composite indicators, and varying levels of 
alpha. To manage the complexity of the simulation design, results within conditions were 
reported in which values across other conditions had been held constant. This approach 
allowed for observations to made about trends in the changes in error rates corresponding 
to changes in values within a condition. The primary limitation associated with this 
approach is that interactions between conditions were not investigated. This potential 
drawback is discussed as an important limitation in Chapter V. Unless otherwise 
specified, combined type I and type II error rates were reported. The choice was made to 
report the sum of the two error rates due to the fact that there was little variation in the 
change in type-I and type-II error rates across the two evaluation designs or conditions 
with one exception. Type-I and type-II error rates changed at different rates when varying 
the designated alpha level. For this reason, type-I and type-II error rates are analyzed 
within separate subsections within the alpha condition. 
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 Inferential comparisons of combined error rates within conditions were conducted 
by using analysis of variance and Tukey post-hoc analysis were applicable. Descriptive 
support was conducted by creating plots depicting changes in error rates across increasing 
evaluation cycles. Plots depicting the change in combined error rates across all possible 
conditional crossings are available in Appendix B. Tables were generated summarizing 
the trends discussed below and referenced within this chapter. Code used to generate 
descriptive tables and graphs in R is provided in Appendix C. 
Hypothesis 
 
 It was hypothesized that the number of evaluation cycles needed to estimate 
teacher effectiveness using nominal error rates would be less when using a composite 
measure of teacher effectiveness compared to a basic, stand-alone value-added model. 
This hypothesis was evaluated by examining trends in the combined error rates of the two 
models as the number of evaluation cycles increased. The research hypothesis was 
evaluated separately for each condition within unique subsections below. Error rates for 
the both the value-added model and the composite measure were investigated and 
compared. The investigation of changes in the combined error rates across evaluation 
cycles within conditions allowed for a conditional interpretation of the research 
hypothesis. Put differently, this approach provided insight into the probable conditions 
necessary in order accept or reject the research hypothesis. The benefit of this approach is 
that implications for practice can be discussed with regards to a range of plausible 
settings in education. General patterns, themes and implications are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter V. 
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Descriptive Analysis 
  
 Trends in error rates across the two evaluative models were analyzed 
descriptively using plots generated in R. A unique plot was generated for each 
conditional crossing in which combined error rates were plotted against successive 
evaluation cycles for each model. Note that because so many plots were generated, only a 
sample was included here in order to provide a quick visual reference (see appendix A). 
All plots have been made available in Appendix B.  
 Several trends can be noted from the plots. First, error rates for the composite 
measure were lower than error rates for the stand alone value-added model during earlier 
cycles. Error rates tended to decline more quickly for the value-added model than for the 
composite measure as additional cycles were used to estimate teacher effects. This means 
that while the error rates were lower initially for the composite measure, there was a 
“crossing-over” in which the error rates of the two models were equal at some number of 
evaluation cycles. Refer to Figure 1 where this “crossing-over” is illustrated for four 
different conditional crossings. This cross-over occurred at different locations depending 
on the simulated conditions. The crossing-over tended to occur earlier when sample size 
was large and when there was no correlation between composite indicators. When sample 
size was small and when there was a moderate to strong relationship between composite 
indicators, the crossing-over occurred after a greater number of evaluation cycles. 
Further, the chosen alpha level appeared to influence the cross-over point as well. Error 
rates for the value-added model appeared to decline more quickly when using less 
conservative alpha levels. This means that the cross-over point occurred earlier in time 
when alpha levels of .05 or .10 were used.  
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Figure 1. Error Rate by Evaluation Cycle 
 
 Error rates across the two models were compared inferentially in the following 
sections. Within each section, a separate analysis is reported in which variation in error 
rates across levels of a single condition were investigated. This approach provided insight 
into the various circumstances that impact the “cross-over” point observed in the 
descriptive plots. This allowed for a nuanced treatment of the research hypothesis which 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. 
Between and Within School Evaluative Schemes 
 
 Combined error rates across the two teacher evaluation models was evaluated 
when comparing teachers between and within schools. The number of teachers was held 
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constant at 12, the correlation between indicators for the composite measure was held at a 
moderate level and the alpha value used for hypothesis testing was held at a .05 level. 
There was not a significant difference in the combined error rates of the value added 
model F(1, 13,998) = 1.73, p = .19, or the composite measure F(1, 13,998) = 1.16, p = 
.28, when comparing error rates estimated for 10 and for 50 schools. This finding 
indicated that there was a strong diminishing benefit to the estimated precision of teacher 
effects associated with sample size increases beyond a threshold. In this scenario, the 
sample size increased from 120 teachers to 600 teachers when the district size increased 
from 10 to 50 schools. This finding is consistent with long-standing principles about the 
diminishing impact of increasing sample size on statistical precision in more general 
contexts (Thompson, 2012).  
 Combined errors were also compared for estimates formed using between versus 
within school samples of teachers. A district size of ten schools was used for this 
analysis. There was a significant difference in the combined errors when comparing 
estimates derived from a between versus a within school sample for both the value-added 
model F(1, 13,998) = 224.47, p < .001, and for the composite measure F(1, 13,998) =  
28.05, p < .001. In this scenario, there was an increase from 12 teachers to 120 achieved 
when pooling teachers across schools. This finding indicated that within even smaller 
districts, a significant increase in the precision of teacher effects can be achieved when 
pooling teachers across schools. The average improvement was around 6.5% for the 
value-added model and around 3.4% for the composite measure. It is worth noting that 
the magnitude of the reduction in error rates achieved through pooling was roughly half 
for the composite measure compared to the value-added model. 
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 To evaluate the research hypothesis, error rates for the two models were 
compared when considering between school and within school evaluative approaches. 
The difference in the average error rates of the value-added and the composite measure 
was significant when comparing teachers between schools using a sample of 10 schools 
F(1, 13,998) = 9.93, p = .001, and when using a sample of 50 schools F(1, 13,998) = 
5.87, p =.02. The difference in average combined errors of the two models was also 
significant when conducting evaluations using within school samples of teachers F(1, 
13,998) = 81.27, p < .001. These analyses confirmed that the moderately correlated 
composite measure had lower error rates on average than the value-added model for both 
evaluative schemes. 
 The magnitude of the difference in error rates between the two models was 
greater when comparing teachers within rather than between schools. This was especially 
evident after examining means and standard deviations (for greater detail refer to Table 
2). When comparing teachers between schools using a sample of ten schools, average 
combined error rate for the value-added model was .113 (SD  = .069). For the composite 
measure, the average was .099 (SD = .041). When comparing teachers within schools the 
average combined error rate for the value-added model was .179 (SD = .095). For the 
composite measure, the average was .131 (SD = .043). Importantly, these findings 
suggest that reductions in combined errors associated with the composite measure are 
greatest when sample sizes are small (i.e., when comparing teachers within schools).  
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Table 2  
 
Average Combined Error Rates by Scheme and Model 
 Number of Schools in Sample 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation 
Cycle 
1 10 50  1 10 50 
3 .342 .231 .222  .193 .180 .168 
4 .265 .176 .170  .171 .144 .136 
5 .189 .120 .118  .150 .108 .103 
6 .155 .096 .090  .130 .096 .091 
7 .121 .071 .063  .110 .084 .078 
8 .100 .057 .051  .091 .070 .065 
9 .080 .042 .039  .072 .057 .053 
Mean (SD) .179 (.095) .113 (.069) .108 (.068)  .131 (.043) .106 (.043) .099 (.041) 
 
Sample of Teachers 
 
 Combined error rates were evaluated when estimating teacher effects using two 
different samples of teachers per schools. In the smaller of the two samples, error rates 
were generated when using a sample of 4 teachers per school. In the larger of the two 
samples, error rates were generated using 12 teachers per school. These values were 
selected to reflect small and large elementary schools in Colorado. Only teachers in the 
fourth, fifth and sixth grades were included in sample size estimates due to the fact that 
standardized testing does not start until the third grade for Colorado students. 
 For this analysis, the number of schools was held constant at 10. This choice was 
justified based on the finding above in which average combined error rates did not 
significantly vary across samples of 10 and 50 schools. The alpha level was held constant 
at .05, and the correlation between composite indicators was held constant at a moderate 
level. There was not a significant difference in the combined error rates of either the 
value-added, F(1, 13,998) = .59, p = .44, or the composite measure, F(1, 13,998) = 0.01, 
p = .03, when comparing teachers from a pooled sample of 10 large versus 10 small 
schools. This finding is similar to the findings from above. Increasing sample sizes from 
89 
 
 
 
40 to 120 teachers did not significantly impact average combined error rates for either 
model. This was treated as further evidence that there is a diminishing benefit to 
estimation precision for both models. 
 Error rates were also evaluated for within school comparisons using different 
sample sizes of teachers. There was a significant difference in the combined error rates 
for both the value-added model, F(1, 13,998) = 66.99, p = < .001, and the composite 
measure F(1, 13,998) = 23.25, p < .001, when comparing teachers within a small versus a 
large school. The average combined error rate of the value added model was .226 (SD = 
.100) when using a sample of 4 teachers, and the average was .179 (SD = .095) when 
there were 12 teachers in the sample. For the composite measure, the average combined 
error rate was .165 (SD = .044) when there were 4 teachers in the sample and .131 (SD = 
.042) These findings confirmed that significantly fewer classification errors were made 
when using a within group sample of teachers from a relatively large versus a relatively 
small school. This finding was true for both models. It is also noted that the magnitude of 
the difference in average error rates when comparing small versus large within group 
samples is larger for the value-added model than for the composite measure.  
 The primary hypothesis was evaluated by comparing error rates across the two 
models for both the small and large samples teachers. There was a significant difference 
in the average combined error rates of the value-added and the composite measure when 
comparing teachers between schools using a sample of 4 teachers per schools F(1, 
13,998) = 428.86, p < .001, and when using a sample of 12 teachers per schools, F(1, 
13,998) = 419.60, p < .001. Likewise, there was a significant difference in the average 
combined errors of the two models when comparing teachers within schools using a 
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sample of 4 teachers, F(1, 13,998) = 631.59, p < .001, and when using a sample of 12 
teachers, F(1, 13,998) = 666.81, p < .001. These findings confirmed that on average, the 
composite measure produced significantly fewer errors than the stand-alone value-added 
model across both large and small samples of teachers. 
 Descriptive statistics were generated to evaluate the magnitude of the difference 
in error rates across the two models. Descriptive statistics reported here are also 
summarized in Table 3a and Table 3b below. When comparing teachers between schools, 
the average combined error rate for the value-added model was .113 (SD = .069) when 
using a sample of 4 teachers per school and .110 (SD = .067) when using a sample of 12 
teachers. The average combined error for the value-added model was .099 (SD = .041) 
for the composite measure when using a sample of 4 teachers per school and .098 (SD   = 
.034) when using a sample of 12 teachers. In short, the moderately correlated composite 
measure produced somewhere between 1.1% to 1.5% fewer errors than a stand-alone 
value-added model using the same sample of teachers for the between school evaluative 
scheme. 
Table 3a  
 
Average Combined Error Rates by Sample and Model (Between Schools) 
 Number of Teachers in Sample 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation Cycle 4 12  4 12 
3 .232 .222  .168 .166 
4 .176 .172  .135 .130 
5 .120 .121  .103 .093 
6 .095 .938  .090 .085 
7 .071 .662  .077 .076 
8 .056 .535  .065 .069 
9 .042 .042  .052 .062 
Mean (SD) .113 (.069) .110 (.067)  .099 (.041) .098 (.034) 
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 When comparing evaluations within schools, the averaged combined error rate for 
the value-added model was .226 (SD = .100) when using a sample of 4 teachers and .179 
(SD = .095) when using a sample of 12 teachers. The average combined error rate was 
.165 (SD = .043) for the composite model when using a sample of 4 teachers and .131 
(SD = .043) when using a sample of 4 teachers. For the within school evaluative scheme, 
the moderately correlated composite measured produced 4.8% to 6.1% fewer errors than 
the value-added model using the same sample of teachers. 
Table 3b  
 
Average Combined Error Rates by Sample and Model (Within Schools) 
 Number of Teachers in Sample 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation Cycle 4 12  4 12 
3 .386 .341  .228 .193 
4 .319 .265  .207 .171 
5 .252 .188  .187 .149 
6 .209 .154  .159 .129 
7 .165 .120  .131 .110 
8 .137 .100  .125 .091 
9 .109 .079  .119 .072 
Mean (SD) .226 (.100) .179 (.094)  .165 (.043) .131 (.043) 
 
 In short, the composite measure had significantly fewer average combined errors 
when using either a small or large sample of teachers per school, but the difference was 
much larger when conducting within school comparisons. Assuming the results 
summarized above generalize to practice, somewhere between 1 to 2 additional teachers 
out of every 100 who were underperforming (i.e., belonging in the 10th percentile) would 
be correctly identified using the composite measure every evaluation cycles when 
conducting between school comparisons. When conducting within school comparisons, 
around 1 additional teacher out of every 20 that were underperforming would be correctly 
identified after every five cycles.  
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Correlation Between Indicators 
 
 In a third condition, the correlation between composite indicators was varied. 
Values for the correlations were chosen by drawing from applied research. Three levels 
were used in the simulation. For the first level, indicators were uncorrelated. For the 
second and third levels, indicators were assigned a moderate and a high level of 
correlation relative to values observed in applied research. The intent behind varying the 
magnitude of the relationship between composite indicators was to estimate a plausible 
range of errors that might be expected for a composite model depending on the actual 
relationship between indicators. 
 For this analysis, a sample size of 4 teachers and 10 schools was used. Alpha was 
held constant at .05. As would be expected, there was no difference in the combined error 
rates for the value-added model across varying levels of correlation between composite 
indicators when comparing teachers between, F(2, 20,997) = 1.86, p = .155, or within 
schools F(2, 20,997) = 0.47, p = .62. There was a significant difference in the error rates 
for the composite model across the three levels of correlation when comparing teachers 
between, F(2, 20,997) = 6.52, p = .001, and within schools, F(2, 20,997) = 15.32, p < 
.001. This confirmed that the level of correlation between composite indicators 
significantly impacted average combined error rates for the composite measure. 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted comparing the combined error rates derived 
from the value-added model and the three levels of the composite measure to better 
understand the differences and where they were occurring. The omnibus f-test was 
significant for the between school evaluation scheme F(3, 27996) = 8.74, p < .001. A 
post-hoc analysis was conducted using Tukey’s range test. Table 3 summarizes the 
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results of the post-hoc analysis. A significant difference in the average combined error 
rates was found between the value-added model and the composite model when there was 
a moderate or a high correlation between indicators. When there was no correlation, the 
difference in average combined error rates between the value-added model and the 
composite measure was not significant. Further, there was a significant difference 
between the combined errors of the no correlation condition and the moderate and high 
conditions but no difference between the moderate and high condition. These findings 
indicated that the relationship between composite indicators significantly impacted error 
rates for the composite measure. There was a difference in the average error rates of the 
value-added model and the composite measure when the indicators were at least 
moderately correlated. 
 Somewhat dissimilar results were found when conducting comparisons within 
rather than between schools. The omnibus test was significant, F(3, 27996) = 121.27, p < 
.001. Using the Tukey method for post-hoc analysis, significant differences in error rates 
were observed between the value-added model and all three levels of correlation for the 
composite measure. In the prior between school analysis, there was no difference 
between the error rates of the value-added model and the uncorrelated composite 
measure. Here, the difference was significant. There was a significant difference in the 
combined errors of the no correlation condition and the moderate and high conditions, but 
no difference between the moderate and high conditions.  
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Table 4  
 
Tukey Range Test  
 Difference Lower Bound Upper Bound p-value 
Between     
VA – 1 .003 -.010 .018 .906 
VA – 2 .020 .005 .035 .002* 
VA – 3 .024 .009 .039 < .001* 
1 – 2  .016 .001 .031 .022* 
1 – 3  .020 .005 .035 .001* 
2 – 3  .004 -.010 .018 .885 
     
Within     
VA – 1 .044 .025 .062 < .001* 
VA – 2 .044 .025 .062 < .001* 
VA – 3 .085 .066 .103 < .001* 
1 – 2  .028 .010 .047 < .001* 
1 – 3  .040 .022 .059 < .001* 
2 – 3  .012 -.006 .030 .323 
Note. Values of 1, 2, and 3 were used to denote the uncorrelated, moderately correlated 
and highly correlated composite measures respectively. Significance is denoted with a * 
at a p < .05 level. 
 
 The magnitude of the difference in error rates across levels of correlation between 
composite indicators was investigated. Refer to Tables 5a and 5b for a summary of the 
values reported below. Values are reported for the between school analysis first. The 
difference in average error rates for the value-added model (M = .1184, SD = .0712) and 
the uncorrelated composite measure (M = .1124, SD = .0494) were negligible. The 
difference was more substantial when compared to the moderately correlated (M = .0979, 
SD = .0374) and the highly correlated (M = .0843, SD = .0369) composite measures. 
These values indicated that with at least a moderate correlation between composite 
indictors, somewhere between 1.85% to 3.2% fewer classification errors were made using 
a composite measure to compare teachers between schools.  
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Table 5a 
 
Averaged Combined Error Rates by Indicator Correlation (Between Schools) 
 Value-Added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation cycle   Low Mid High 
3 .241  .195 .168 .163 
4 .184  .157 .135 .123 
5 .127  .119 .103 .083 
6 .100  .100 .090 .074 
7 .073  .081 .077 .065 
8 .059  .071 .065 .061 
9 .044  .060 .052 .056 
Mean (SD) .118 (.071)  .112 (.049) .097 (.037) .084 (.036) 
 
 When comparing teachers within schools, the magnitude of the difference in 
average error rates was significantly different for the value-added model (M = .2198, SD 
= .0983) and the uncorrelated composite measure (M = .1747, SD = .0690). The 
difference was also significant when comparing the error rates of the value-added model 
to the moderately correlated composite measure (M = .1655, SD = .0432) and the highly 
correlated composite measure (M =.1370, SD = .0390). Somewhere between 4.6% and 
8.3% fewer errors were made using the composite measure to compare teachers within 
schools. Importantly, these findings imply that when sample sizes are very small and 
when using five or fewer aggregated evaluation cycles, an uncorrelated composite 
measure may produce fewer classification errors than a stand-alone value-added model. 
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Table 5b 
Averaged Combined Error Rates by Indicator Correlation (Within Schools) 
 Value-Added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation cycle   Low Mid High 
3 .380  .294 .228 .199 
4 .310  .238 .207 .127 
5 .241  .182 .187 .146 
6 .201  .149 .159 .131 
7 .161  .117 .131 .117 
8 .134  .118 .125 .103 
9 .108  .120 .119 .088 
Mean (SD) .219 (.098)  .174 (.068) .165 (.043) .137 (.039) 
 
Alpha Value 
 
 A final condition was included in the simulation for comparing error rates when 
using different alpha levels. Three levels were included in the simulation representing 
values often chosen in scientific research. The values chosen for alpha were .01, .05 and 
.10.  
 A type-I error is when the null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. Within the 
context of this research, a type-I error is when a teacher above average was misclassified 
as performing significantly below average. The reverse case in which a teacher below 
average was classified as significantly above average was also a type-I error. A type-II 
error is when the null hypothesis is incorrectly accepted. Within the context of this 
research, a type-II error was when a teacher significantly below average was 
misclassified as average. Teachers significantly below average were operationalized as 
those in the 10th percentile or below on the performance distribution. The 10th percentile 
was chosen such that the results would relate back to Hanushek’s “teacher deselection” 
argument (Hanushek, 2009). Type-II errors increase as more conservative alpha levels 
are chosen. This means that by choosing a certain alpha level, a practitioner is implicitly 
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weighting the importance of one error type over the other. Implications for practice are 
discussed with regards to this trade-off in Chapter V. 
Type-I Errors 
 
 For this analysis, the number of teachers per school was held constant at 4, the 
number of schools per sample was held constant at 10, and the correlation between 
indicators was held at a constant moderate level. There was a significant difference in 
average type-I error rate for the value added model, F(2, 20,997) = 482.09, p < .001, and 
for the composite measure, F(2, 20,997) = 128.24, p < .001, across the three alpha levels 
when comparing teachers between schools. Likewise, the difference in average type-I 
error rate was significant for both the value-added model F(2, 20,997) = 1005, p < .001, 
and for the composite measure, F(2, 20,997) = 192.67, p < .001, when comparing 
teachers within schools. This result was expected. This confirmed that type-I error rate 
was impacted by the chosen alpha level for both models. 
 To evaluate the research hypothesis, type-I error rates were compared across the 
two evaluative models at each level of alpha. Results are reported for the between school 
analysis first. There were significant difference in the type-I error rates for the two 
models at alpha levels of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 179.75, p < .001), .05, F(1, 13,998) = 
138.66, p < .001, and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 252.82, p < .001. Likewise, there were 
significant differences in the type-I error rates when comparing teachers within schools at 
alpha levels of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 416.56, p < . 001, .05, F(1, 13,998) = 581.19, p < .001, 
and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 605.16, p < .001. These findings confirmed that there were 
different type-I error rates associated with the two evaluative models at the different 
levels of alpha. 
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 To better understand the magnitude of the differences, descriptive statistics were 
calculated. Values reported below are summarized in tables 6a and 6b. For the value-
added model and when comparing teachers between schools, the average type-I errors 
were .0014 (SD = .0003) at an alpha of .01, .0085 (SD = .0010) at an alpha of .05, and 
.0186 (SD = .0042) at an alpha of .10. For the composite model and when comparing 
teachers between schools, the average type-I errors were .0005 (SD < .0001), at an alpha 
of .01, .0039 (SD = .0004) at an alpha of .05, and .0068 (SD = .0010) at an alpha of .10.  
Table 6a  
 
Average Type-I Error Rates by Alpha Value (Between Schools) 
 Alpha value 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation Cycle .01 .05 .10  .01 .05 .10 
3 .0019 .0102 .0257  .0006 .0047 .0086 
4 .0016 .0094 .0222  .0005 .0040 .0077 
5 .0013 .0085 .0186  .0005 .0032 .0068 
6 .0012 .0082 .0179  .0004 .0037 .0065 
7 .0011 .0080 .0172  .0004 .0041 .0062 
8 .0011 .0075 .0152  .0004 .0039 .0059 
9 .0011 .0071 .0131  .0004 .0037 .0056 
Mean (SD) .0014 (.0003) .0085(.0010) .0186 (.0042)  .0005 (.0001) .0039 (.0004) .0068 (.0010) 
 
 For the value-added model and when comparing teachers within schools, the 
average type-I errors were .0022 (SD = .0004) at an alpha of .01, .0138 (SD = .0020) at 
an alpha of .05, and .0300 (SD = .0042) at an alpha of .10. For the composite model and 
when comparing teachers within schools, the average type-I errors were .0007 (SD = 
.0002), at an alpha of .01, .0039 (SD = .0006) at an alpha of .05, and .0094 (SD = .0019) 
at an alpha of .10. There are several important implications from these findings. First, the 
average type-I error rate at five evaluation cycles peaked at around 3% for the value-
added model and around 1% for the composite model. Second, the variation in type-I 
error rates was not substantial. Type-I errors increased marginally as the alpha value 
increased for both models. 
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Table 6b  
 
Average Type-I Error Rates by Alpha Value Within Schools) 
 Alpha value 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation Cycle .01 .05 .10  .01 .05 .10 
3 .0029 .0160 .0368  .0008 .0050 .0118 
4 .0025 .0155 .0337  .0008 .0043 .0110 
5 .0022 .0150 .0307  .0008 .0036 .0103 
6 .0021 .0141 .0292  .0007 .0035 .0096 
7 .0020 .0132 .0277  .0005 .0034 .0089 
8 .0019 .0117 .0263  .0005 .0034 .0075 
9 .0017 .0103 .0249  .0005 .0033 .0062 
Mean (SD) .0022 (.0004) .0138 (.0020) .0300 (.0042)  .0007 (.0002) .0039 (.0006) .0094 (.0019) 
 
Type-II Errors 
 
 The data conditions used in this analyses matched the conditions used for 
analyzing type-I errors. There was a significant difference in type-II error rates for the 
value added model, F(2, 20,997) = 480.01, p < .001, and for the composite measure, F(2, 
20,997) = 175.01, p < .001, across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers 
between schools. Likewise, the difference in type-II errors were significant for the value-
added model, F(2, 20,997) = 903.43, p < .001, and for the composite measure, F(2, 
20,997) 119.43, p < .001, across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers within 
schools. Again, this simply confirmed that type-II errors varied with the chosen level of 
alpha. 
 Average type-II errors for the two evaluative models were compared across the 
three levels of alpha. Results are reported for the between school analysis first. There was 
a significant difference in average type-II error rates between the value-added and the 
composite measure at an alpha of .01, F(1, 13,998) = 22.54, p < .001. There was not a 
difference in average type-II error rates when using an alpha level of .05, F(1, 13,998) = 
2.45, p = .116, or an alpha level of .10, F(1, 13,998 ) = 0.71, p = .340. The lack of a 
significant difference between the type-II error rates of the two models at the less 
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conservative alpha levels was evaluated further. When using an alpha level of .05, there 
was a significant difference between the type-II error rates for the two models at three, 
F(1, 1998) = 22.65, p < .001, through five evaluation cycles, F(1, 1998) = 6.21, p = .01. 
Further, there was a significant difference in type-II error rates of the two models at three, 
F(1, 1998) = 7.47, p = .006, but not five, F(1, 1998) = 1.04, p = .30, evaluation cycles 
when using an alpha of .10. These findings indicated that type-II error rates did not start 
at the same level or change with uniformity across the two evaluation models as an 
increasing number of aggregated evaluation cycles were used to estimate teacher effects. 
As the alpha level became less conservative, type-II errors started at a lower point and 
dropped more quickly for the value-added model than for the composite measure. This 
resulted in non-significant differences starting around the sixth cycle when an alpha level 
of .05 was used and around the fifth cycle when an alpha level of .10 was used. This 
trend is illustrated in Figure 2 below. What this may mean is that stand-alone value-added 
model benefited more from the use of less conservative alpha levels. This finding may 
have interesting implications for practice and will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
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Figure 2. Type-II Error Rate by Alpha Value and by Model  
 
 When comparing teachers within schools, there was a significant difference in the 
average type-II error rates at alpha levels of .01, F(1 13,998) = 296.32, p <.001, .05, F(1, 
13,998) = 58.45, p < .001, and .10, F(1, 13,998) = 15.78, p < .001. Unlike the trend 
described above, average type-II errors were significantly different across all three levels 
of alpha. The implication was that while type-II error rates dropped more quickly for the 
value-added model across evaluation cycles, higher overall error rates associated with the 
smaller within group samples delayed the point at which type-II errors were equal for the 
two models. These findings demonstrated that (a) type-II error rates varied with alpha 
levels as was expected, and (b) the average type-II error rate of change varied across 
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models. When the sample size was larger (i.e., when teachers were being compared using 
pooled samples between schools), and when less conservative alpha levels were used, 
type-II error rates for the value-added model dipped below error rates for the composite 
measure using fewer evaluation cycles. When sample sizes were smaller (i.e., when 
comparisons are made within schools) and when more conservative alpha levels were 
used, type-II error rates for the value-added model dipped below error rates for the 
composite measure using more evaluation cycles. 
 Descriptive statistics were computed to better understand the changes in type-II 
error rates by model and by alpha level. The between school error rates are discussed 
first. The average type-II error rate for the value-added model was .2264 (SD = .1138) at 
an alpha level of .01, .1015 (SD = .0657) at an alpha level of .05, and .0661 (SD  = .0466) 
at an alpha level of .10. The average type-II error rate for the composite measure was 
.1860 (SD = .0690) at an alpha level of .01, .0939 (SD = .0370) at an alpha level of .05, 
and .0639 (SD = .0295) at an alpha level of .10.   
Table 7a 
 
Average Type-II Error Rates by Alpha Value Between Schools) 
 Alpha value 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Cycle .01 .05 .10  .01 .05 .10 
3 .408 .212 .146  .304 .161 .115 
4 .333 .162 .108  .249 .126 .089 
5 .257 .112 .071  .196 .090 .063 
6 .205 .085 .053  .167 .081 .056 
7 .153 .058 .034  .142 .072 .050 
8 .126 .045 .027  .128 .065 .040 
9 .099 .033 .020  .115 .059 .030 
Mean (SD) .226 (.114) .102 (.066) .066 (.047)  .186 (.069) .094 (.037) .064 (.030) 
 
 There were significantly fewer type-II errors associated with the composite model 
when there were fewer evaluation cycles used in the analysis. As the number of 
evaluation cycles increased, the type-II error rate for the value-added model dropped 
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more rapidly than for the composite model. Depending on the other data conditions, the 
value-added model had a lower error rate than the composite measure somewhere 
between the fifth and eighth evaluation cycle. Again, refer back to Figure 1 for depiction 
of this general trend.  
 Descriptive statistics were also computed for the within school comparison. 
Average type-II error rates were significantly lower for the composite model than for the 
value-added model across all three levels of alpha when comparing teachers within 
schools (i.e., when sample size is small). Refer to Table 7b below for more information. 
The average type-II error rate for the value-added model was .4000 (SD = .1253) at an 
alpha level of .01, .2120 (SD = .0983) at an alpha level of .05 and .1368 (SD = .0726) at 
an alpha level of .10. The average type-II error rate for the composite model was .2401 
(SD = .0683) at an alpha level of .01, .1616 (SD = .0426) at an alpha level of .05, and 
.1174 (SD = .0447) at an alpha level of .10.  
Table 7b  
 
Average Type-II Error Rates by Alpha Value (Within Schools) 
 Alpha value 
 Value-added Model  Composite Measure 
Evaluation Cycle .01 .05 .10  .01 .05 .10 
3 .584 .370 .266  .349 .222 .184 
4 .516 .303 .204  .305 .203 .160 
5 .449 .237 .151  .260 .183 .136 
6 .391 .194 .121  .226 .155 .111 
7 .334 .152 .090  .191 .127 .087 
8 .285 .125 .074  .179 .121 .076 
9 .236 .099 .058  .168 .115 .065 
Mean (SD) .400 (.125) .212 (.098) .137 (.073)  .241 (.068) .162 (.043)  .117 (.045) 
 
 Type-II error rate dropped more quickly for the value-added model than for the 
composite model across successive evaluation cycles. When comparing teacher between 
rather than within schools, the point at which the error rates for the two models were 
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equal occurred later. When using an alpha of .05, the error rates for the two models were 
equal somewhere between the eighth and ninth cycles, depending on data conditions.  
 These findings confirmed that the chosen alpha value impacted the rate at which 
teachers in the 10th percentile of the performance distribution were incorrectly classified 
as average. When using an alpha value of .01, around 20% to 40% of teachers in the 10th 
percentile were incorrectly classified as average on average using the stand-alone value-
added model. Using the same alpha level, around 18% to 25% of underperforming 
teachers were misclassified using the composite model on average. Misclassification 
rates were significantly lower for both models when using a less conservative alpha. 
Using an alpha level of .10, around 7% to 14% of teachers in the 10th percentile were 
misclassified for the value-added model, and around 6% to 11% of teachers in the 10th 
percentile were misclassified as average for the composite model. It is important to note 
that the drop-off in type-II errors was much more dramatic than the increases in type-I 
errors associated when using less conservative alpha levels. Whereas type-I errors 
increased by around 1% to 3% depending on the model, type-II errors dropped by around 
15% to 20%, depending on the model.  
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Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
Overview 
 The primary hypothesis of this study was that a composite measure could be used 
to estimate teacher effectiveness with lower error rates than a conventional value-added 
model in the same time frame. This hypothesis was evaluated using simulated data which 
were parameterized using varying conditions in order to represent a variety of educational 
contexts. Two models were fit to the data in order to estimate teacher effects: a simple 
stand-alone value-added model and a composite measure. Error rates were computed for 
the two models and compared. The hypothesis was supported in some but not all of the 
simulated conditions. Discussion provided below focuses on when one might expect error 
rates to be lower for the composite measure than for the value-added model based on the 
results. Trends in the change in error rates across evaluation cycles is emphasized.   
General Trends 
 General trends in error rates across the two models are discussed in this section. 
More detailed discussions regarding changes in error rates across simulated conditions 
are provided in proceeding sections. As a general comment, the generalizability of these 
findings depends largely on the extent to which simulated conditions reflect real world 
data. Simulated data were necessarily simplistic and several assumptions are made. For 
this reason, implications are discussed as trends that can be expected in practice but may 
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not hold as circumstances between the simulation and the applied scenario become more 
disparate. Other limitations are discussed near the end of this chapter. 
 Combined error rates decreased as the number of evaluation cycles increased. 
This was true for both the value-added model and for the composite measure. For 
reference, this trend is illustrated in the plots provided in Appendix B. Error rates are 
expected to decrease as the amount of data used to estimate teacher effects increases. The 
first important trend observed was that the composite measure tended to produce fewer 
errors than the value-added model when fewer evaluation cycles were used to estimate 
teacher effects. The magnitude of the differences depended on data conditions, but in 
general, the improvement was greater when smaller sample sizes were used. A second 
important trend was that error rates decline more rapidly for the value-added model than 
for the composite measure as addition evaluation cycles were included in the evaluation.  
 This means that while there tended to be fewer errors associated with the 
composite measure when using fewer aggregated evaluation cycles, the value-added 
model produced fewer errors as the amount of available data reached a certain threshold. 
The exact threshold depended on the various simulated conditions but ranged between 
four and nine evaluation cycles. This finding has practical importance. A composite 
measure may be more accurate when few evaluation cycles are aggregated or when 
sample size is small. All things being equal, the use of fewer evaluation cycles is 
favorable from an evaluative perspective. When using fewer evaluation cycles, quicker 
evaluation windows allow for more regular impact, and fewer assumptions are made 
about the communicability of aggregated data across cycles. One important consideration 
is that while the evidence seemed to indicate that a composite measure may be used to 
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reduce combined errors when using fewer evaluation cycles, a composite measure also 
requires greater resources to implement. The amount of time and effort required to 
implement a composite measure increases as the number of teachers being evaluated also 
increases (assuming in-class observations are used as part of the measure). The same is 
not necessarily true for a stand-alone value-added model which can be implemented 
procedurally. From a practical standpoint, the need to control error rates must be weighed 
against availability of resources for implementing a composite measure.  
 It is important to note that while the error rates for the composite measure where 
lower than for the value-added model during earlier evaluation cycles, it is not clear 
whether error rates were low enough to be used for high-stakes evaluation system. 
Speculations about the exact error threshold necessary for high-stakes evaluations is 
beyond the scope of this study. Even so, at three evaluation cycles, the composite 
measure averaged around 41% combined errors in the worst data conditions and around 
12.5% in the most favorable data conditions. The practical implication may be that for 
high-stakes evaluation systems, neither approach provides adequately precise estimates in 
a reasonable window. This finding has implications for Hanushek’s “teacher deselection” 
argument (Hanushek, 2009). Hanushek argued that by identifying and then by replacing 
teachers in the lowest 10th percentile of performance with average teachers, the quality of 
education could be improved dramatically within a short window. This argument assumes 
that teachers in the lowest 10th percentile can be identified objectively and accurately. 
The evidence from this study indicated that even under very favorable conditions and 
when using a composite measure to evaluate teachers, somewhere around 10% of 
teachers in the lowest 10th percentile would be misclassified when using data aggregated 
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from three evaluation cycles. Assuming more typical conditions, the number may be 
closer to 25%. Given that the majority of errors were type-II, the implication is that 
somewhere between one in ten and one in four poorly performing teachers would go 
unidentified in a typical evaluation window. This may not mean that Hanushek’s reform 
would fail. Rather, the implication is that the impact of Hanushek’s or a similar reform 
effort is optimistic. Errors in classification would increase the time required before 
reform efforts could produce noteworthy improvements. 
 Another important trend observed was that while the use of additional evaluation 
cycles improved precision for both models, this improvement was less for the composite 
than for the value-added model. At a certain point, it may be advisable to use a stand-
alone value-added model if the goal is to maximize estimation precision and resource 
allocation. The point at which the value-added model produced lower error rates than the 
composite measure varied across the simulated conditions. The threshold occurred later 
when data conditions were poor (i.e., smaller sample sizes and comparisons within 
schools) and when indicators were highly correlated. The threshold occurred at an earlier 
point when data conditions were more favorable (i.e., larger sample sizes and 
comparisons between schools) and when composite indicators where uncorrelated. These 
themes are discussed in greater detail in the sections below where trends in error rates are 
discussed for each simulated condition. 
 If assuming a moderate correlation between indicators, the implication is that a 
composite measure may produce fewer classification errors when using smaller sample 
sizes and fewer evaluation cycles. When using a larger sample size and more evaluation 
cycles, the benefit of using a composite measure decreases, especially when also taking 
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into consideration the additional resources required for implementation. In summary, the 
evidence indicated that a composite measure could be used to reduce combined error 
rates when indicators are moderately correlated and when fewer evaluation cycles are 
used to compare teachers. In this way the primary hypothesis was conditionally 
supported. Practically, the implication is that modeling choices are nuanced even when 
prioritizing combined errors and should depend on several additional factors. Modeling 
choice should depend on: a) the nature and availability of the data for evaluating teachers 
(i.e., sample size), b) the number of intended evaluation cycles to be included, c) 
reasonability about assumptions regarding the relationships between composite 
indicators, and d) the availability of administrative resources needed for implementing 
resource intensive measures. 
 The discussion in the proceeding sections is organized around the various 
simulated conditions. Error rates across the two models are discussed with regards to 
variation in the levels simulated for each condition. Potential implications are drawn for 
practice. 
Correlation Between Indicators 
 Three levels were simulated representing different levels of correlation between 
composite indicators. Composite indicators were generated to have no correlation, to 
have a moderate correlation and to have a high correlation. It was found that the level of 
correlation between indicators significantly impacted combined error rates for the 
composite measure. When there was no correlation, error rates were significantly higher 
than if there was either a moderate or high correlation. When comparing the value-added 
model to the three variations of the composite measure, it was found that the value-added 
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model had higher error rates when there were fewer evaluation cycles. As the number of 
evaluation cycles increased, the error rates for the value-added model eventually dipped 
lower than all three variations of the composite model. Importantly, this “crossing-over” 
occurred earlier for the composite measure where indicators were uncorrelated. For the 
uncorrelated condition, the crossing-over occurred at around four evaluation cycles when 
comparing teachers between schools and at around six evaluation cycles when comparing 
teachers within schools. For the moderately correlated condition, this crossing over did 
not occur until around six evaluation cycles when comparing teachers between schools 
and not until around nine evaluation cycles when comparing teachers within schools. 
 Several implications can be drawn from these findings. The first important 
implication is that the error rates for the value-added model were higher than for the 
uncorrelated composite measure when using only three evaluation cycles. This finding 
was not expected. The implication is that under very restrictive data conditions, fewer 
classification mistakes can be expected when using a composite measure, even when 
indicators loading on a single dimension are completely independent from one another. 
The magnitude of the difference in error rates between the uncorrelated composite 
measure and the value-added model at three evaluation cycles is large enough to be of 
practical significance. When comparing teachers between schools, around 7% fewer 
teachers would be misclassified using the uncorrelated composite measure and around 
10% fewer when comparing teachers within schools. Bearing in mind that the majority of 
errors were type-II across all conditional combinations, this means that one could expect 
that around 8% fewer poorly performing teachers would be misclassified as average 
when using an uncorrelated composite measure estimated from data aggregated across 
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three evaluation cycles. If assuming a small school, this would mean that around one 
additional teacher misclassified using a value-added model would be identified as 
performing in the lowest tenth percentile during a typical evaluation window (if assuming 
all teachers were truly underperforming). It is important to note that the error rates for the 
uncorrelated composite measure were still relatively high at around 19% for the between 
school comparison and at around 25% percent for the within school comparison.  
This finding is of particular importance when assuming that evaluations are rarely 
conducted using more than three evaluation cycles. The practical implication is that the 
precision of a composite measure is superior for realistic evaluative scenarios, even when 
composite indicators are poorly correlated. When assuming some a moderate correlation, 
error rates can be expected to be even lower for the composite measure.  
Evaluative Scheme 
 Two evaluation scenarios were simulated. In the first scenario, teachers were 
compared between schools. This scenario was assumed to be more typical. Comparing 
between schools allows for larger sample sizes. Researchers have noted that while sample 
sizes can be improved using this strategy, comparisons are less ideal as systematic 
differences between resources and context may bias estimates of teacher effects 
(Schochet & Chiang, 2010). For this reason, a second scenario was simulated in which 
teachers were compared within schools. Simulating evaluation schemes comparing 
teachers between and within schools allowed for observations to be drawn about the 
trade-offs between precision and bias in the estimation of teacher effects. 
 The first important observation was that there was a significant difference for both 
the composite measure and the value-added model in the error rates across between and 
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within school comparisons. On average, combined error rates were around 5% higher in 
the within school condition averaged across both evaluation models. At only three 
evaluation cycles, the difference was fairly large averaging around 16% for the value-
added model and around 6% for the composite measure. Assuming average school sizes 
in Colorado, these findings imply that around one in ten additional teachers will be 
misclassified when conducting comparisons within rather than between schools. This 
finding was expected and is consistent with the findings of Schochet and Chiang. In 
short, the implication is that by pooling teachers across schools, districts can obtain a 
meaningful improvement to the estimated precision of teacher effects. The decision to 
pool must be weighed against concerns that pooling will introduce bias. In relatively 
homogeneous districts where resources, student demographics and other factors 
contributing to student growth are similar across schools, pooling will have less impact. 
Future research might consider investigating the trade-off between bias and precision 
introduced through pooing while considering districts with varying levels of homogeneity 
across schools. 
 A second important observation was that there was only a marginal improvement 
to error rates when comparing samples drawn from small and large districts. Put another 
way, the evidence indicated that there is a diminishing benefit to precision associated 
with increasingly large sample sizes provided by pooled samples in large districts. 
Several implications can be drawn from this finding. First, relatively large schools may 
only see a marginal improvement to error rates when pooling samples with other schools. 
Predicting ideal sample sizes for within school comparisons is beyond the scope of this 
study, but such research could have practical benefit. A second implication is that it 
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might not be advisable to arbitrarily pool all available schools within a district. Because 
there was a diminishing benefit associated within increasing sample sizes, it might be 
better to form sub-pools using groupings of similar schools. These “sub-pools” would be 
formed using groupings of schools deemed to be characteristically homogenous. This 
strategy would reduce the amount of bias introduced through pooling while increasing 
sample size up to a point at which the greatest benefit is realized.  
 It should be noted that the benefit of pooling was roughly half for the composite 
measure compared to the value-added model. It was assumed that this was due to the fact 
that the composite measure estimated teacher effects using more information than did the 
value-added model. Consequently, increases to sample size impacted error rates less. The 
implication is that if districts opt to conduct comparisons within schools, a composite 
measure may produce lower error rates on average (assuming a moderate correlation 
between indicators). Alternatively, the choice to pool may be made if opting to use a 
stand-alone value added model knowing that pooling reduces error rates for a stand-alone 
value added model more dramatically. 
 Finally, the magnitude of the reduction to errors achieved through pooling 
depended on the number of evaluation cycles used to compare teachers. At nine 
evaluation cycles the reduction is reduced to .037 for the value-added model and .020 for 
the composite model. There was a diminishing benefit gained from pooling teachers 
across schools while also aggregating an increasing number of evaluation cycles used for 
teacher comparisons. The implication for practice is that additional evaluation cycles can 
be incorporated into evaluation schemes for smaller districts or schools which cannot 
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achieve meaningful sample sizes through pooling. This approach would trade timely 
evaluation for increased evaluation precision.  
Alpha Level 
 Schochet and Chiang did not consider the impact of varying levels of alpha on 
type-I and type-II error rates. In this study, error rates were computed using alpha values 
of .01, .05 and .10. It was found that there was variation in how type-I and type-II error 
rates changed across varying levels of alpha. The first important finding was that the 
type-I error rates remained relatively low, even when using alpha levels of .10. When 
using an alpha level of .10, type-I error rates for the value-added model peaked at around 
3% and around 1% for the composite measure. On the other hand, type-II errors changed 
more dramatically as alpha changed. At an alpha of .01, type-II errors averaged around 
22% for the value-added model and around 18% for the composite model. At an alpha of 
.10 type-II errors drop to around 6% for both the value-added model and for the 
composite model.  
 What this means for practice may depend on the varying priorities of different 
evaluation systems. A system which favors identifying low performing teachers might 
opt for a higher level of alpha. Alternatively, if it is a higher priority to avoid 
misidentifying high performing teachers, then the evaluation system might favor a more 
conservative alpha level. The important finding was that type-I and type-II errors may not 
be evenly balanced with regards to the two options. Favoring to avoid type-I errors 
resulted in greatly increased type-II errors. Favoring to avoid type-II errors resulted in 
slightly increased type-I errors. This means that by choosing more conservative alpha 
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levels, the evaluation model is prioritizing type-I errors heavily over type-II errors. 
Choosing higher alpha values prioritizes the lowest possible combined error rates.  
A second important finding was that the change in type-II errors across the three levels of 
alpha was not the same for the value-added and for the composite measure. There was a 
significant difference in the average type-II error rate between the two models at an alpha 
level of .01. There was not a significant difference at alpha levels of .05 and .10. At an 
alpha of .10, the average type-II error rate was roughly equal for the value-added and for 
the composite measure. The was caused by a difference in the how rapidly error rates 
declined across an increasing number of evaluation cycles for the two models. When 
using less conservative alpha levels, type-II errors dropped more rapidly for the value-
added model than for the composite model. Depending on the data conditions, the type-II 
error rate for the value-added model would drop below the error rate for the composite 
model at around five to six cycles. What this means is that while the composite measure 
tended to have lower error rates when using fewer cycles, the value-added model tended 
to have lower error rates when using more cycles. The point at which the error rates of 
the two models were equal depended on the alpha level.  
 To the extent that these findings generalize to practice, this means that choices 
about modeling are nuanced and depend heavily on evaluative priorities and availability 
of resources. For example, a school district might opt for a composite style evaluation 
system if the goal is to use fewer evaluation cycles. In this scenario, the district could 
choose an alpha level based on the relative importance of type-I errors weighed against 
total combined errors. In a second scenario, a school district might not have the resources 
to implement a composite type measure and might opt to use a stand-alone value-added 
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model. To compensate for the increase to type-II errors, the district could increase the 
number of aggregated evaluation cycles while using a slightly less conservative alpha 
level to maximize the reduction in combined errors.  
 Schochet and Chiang speculated as to the priorities of different parties involved in 
teacher evaluation. On one hand, administrators and parents might favor an approach 
which minimizes type-II errors out of fear that underperforming teachers might slip 
through the cracks. This priority is also consistent with Hanushek’s “teacher deselection 
argument” which prioritizes identifying and replacing underperforming teachers. The 
evidence indicated that a priority such as this would imply the use of a less conservative 
alpha. The good news would be that while using a less conservative alpha, type-I errors 
increase in only small degrees. Teachers, on the other hand, might be more concerned 
with the possibility of being misidentified as underperforming. This concern is likely 
shared by administrators fearing the possibility of legal recourse if evaluations lead to 
unfair sanctions or rewards. In such cases, the evidence indicated that type-I errors could 
be controlled by using more conservative alpha levels, but at the cost of greatly increased 
type-II errors. Essentially, the trade-off when choosing an alpha level for both models is 
between a more accurate (less conservative alpha) or a more fair (more conservative 
alpha) evaluative system.  
Sample Size 
 The number of teachers was varied to investigate error rates associated with the 
value-added and the composite measure when applied to small and large schools. The 
sample size of teachers for both small and large schools was determined by investigating 
typical school sizes in Colorado. It was found that when comparing teachers between 
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schools, there was not a significant difference in error rates when comparing districts 
with all small or all large schools. This finding indicated that both models are relatively 
efficient when using sample typical in Colorado. This finding may suggest that when 
pooling teachers within a district, it may not be advantageous to arbitrarily pool all 
teachers. Within a large district, several pools may be formed using more or less 
homogenous schools in order to balance the trade-off between bias and precision. 
On the other hand, there was a significant reduction in combined error rates when 
conducting teacher evaluations within small versus large schools. Assuming a moderate 
correlation between indicators and an alpha level of .05, the average error rates for the 
value-added model was around 22% for the value-added and around 16% for the 
composite measure. There are several implications based on these findings. First, error 
rates were somewhat high. When conducting within school comparisons within a small 
school, the evidence indicated that around one in five underperforming teachers would be 
misclassified using either model even after incorporating five evaluation cycles into the 
evaluation. This finding implies that small schools may need to consider pooling their 
sample of teachers with other schools in order to achieve reasonable error rates. 
Secondly, the composite measure produced significantly less error rates than the value-
added model under these somewhat restrictive data conditions. The implication is that if a 
small school decided to conduct teacher comparisons using only a within school sample, 
a composite measure would be more practically useful than a stand-alone value-added 
model.  
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Limitations 
Several assumptions were made in the generation process in order to keep the process 
manageable and reasonably accurate. Many of the assumptions revolved around limiting 
real-world complexities common in applied settings. For a list of these assumptions, see 
Chapter III. The consequence of making these assumptions is that the generated data 
were overly simplistic compared to data used in practice. This is typical of data generated 
for this type of research as the goal is often to explore methodological trends. As such, 
reasonably approximated data serve the primary purpose. It is difficult to predict how 
practical complexities might have influenced error rates across the two models. To 
illustrate, the data were generated assuming that students do not matriculate in and out of 
classes or schools. Student mobility is a practical complication which likely introduces 
some amount of noise into model estimates. This effect would likely be a decrease in 
precision. It was also assumed that students were randomly assigned to teachers. Lack of 
random assignment may actually increase precision by increasing the amount of 
variability between teachers. This would be caused by intra-correlations between students 
in the same class. As such, implications drawn from this research are treated as plausible 
trends while acknowledging that data were too simplistic to draw precise conclusions 
about the error rates of the two models in practice. 
 Results were presented by investigating trends across a single condition while 
holding values for other conditions constant. This approach simplified analysis and 
reporting but also prevented an analysis of possible interactions between conditions. For 
example, there may have been an interaction between the chosen alpha level and sample 
size on error rates. Examining possibilities such as this was beyond the scope of this 
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research. The primary goal was to compare error rates for a value-added and for a 
composite measure across a small number of simulated conditions. It is noted here to 
acknowledge that interpretations of results may have been different if interactions were 
present.  
Conclusion 
 There was evidence that under certain conditions, a composite measure estimates 
teacher effects with greater precision than a value-added model. In short, error rates for 
the composite measure were better under more restrictive data conditions. Such 
conditions included when smaller sample sizes were used, when comparisons were made 
within rather than between schools, and when fewer evaluation cycles were used to 
estimate teacher effects. The implication is that the use of a composite measure can help 
to compensate for less than ideal data conditions. As data conditions improved, error 
rates for the stand-alone value-added model eventually dipped below error rates for the 
composite measure. This means that for larger districts and for between school teacher 
comparisons, the extra effort and resources required for the composite measure may have 
reduced or no benefit. Future research may be conducted investigating rules of thumb that 
might be useful for deciding between different teacher evaluation models. As a rough 
suggestion, the data from the current study indicated that when using four or fewer 
evaluation cycles for most data conditions, a composite measure will likely produce 
lower error rates than a basic, stand-alone value-added approach. That said, this finding 
may not hold under more realistic conditions or when comparing a collection of more 
complex models.  
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 An additional finding which may have important implications for practice was 
that the choice of alpha level when conducting teacher comparisons may be somewhat 
nuanced. This was the first known study to investigate the impact of different alpha levels 
on the error rates of different teacher evaluation models. The important finding was that 
type-II errors changed far more dramatically across alpha levels than did type-I errors. 
Type-I errors remained somewhat low, even when using less conservative alpha levels. 
Type type-II errors dropped dramatically when shifting towards less conservative alpha 
levels. This may mean that by choosing an alpha level for hypothesis testing, a school or 
district is essentially weighing the importance of type-I errors versus combined errors. 
Restated from an earlier section in this chapter, this is essentially a choice between model 
fairness (conservative alpha levels) and effectiveness (less conservative alpha levels). 
Here it is speculated that the choice may depend most strongly on whether the evaluation 
system is tied to high or low stakes outcomes.  
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APPENDIX A 
DIAGRAM OF SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTIVE PLOTS: ERROR RATE BY CONDITION 
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APPENDIX C 
SIMULATION CODE 
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GENERATION FILE 
library(lme4) 
library(MASS) 
 
diss_simbetween <- function(pe = .92, pt = .03, pc = .035, ps = .011, po_t = .90, po_s = 
.10, po_c = .05, 
                            r12 = .5, r13  = .7, r23 = .5, 
                            alpha = .05, thresh = .275, 
                            students = 23, classes = 3, teachers = 10, schools = 5, 
                            iters = 1) { 
     
    # Pulls se and ols variance from lmer model 
    se.extract <- function(model, po) { 
         
        if(po == FALSE) { 
            var_w <- VarCorr(model)[["cla"]][[1]] / (classes) 
            var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (students * classes) 
            #var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (((schools * teachers) - 1) / (schools * 
teachers)) 
            var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * ((schools * teachers) / ((schools * teachers) - 
1)) 
            se_ols <- sqrt(var_ols) 
        } 
         
        if(po == TRUE) { 
            var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (classes) 
            #var_ols <- var_e * (((schools * teachers) - 1) / (schools * teachers)) 
            var_ols <- var_e * ((schools * teachers) / ((schools * teachers) - 1)) 
            se_ols <- 0 
        } 
         
        list(var_ols = var_ols, se_ols = se_ols) 
    } 
     
    library(MASS) 
    library(lme4) 
    stu <- 1:(students * teachers * classes * schools) 
    cla <- rep(1:(teachers * classes * schools), each = students) 
    tea <- rep(1:(teachers * schools), each = students * classes) 
    sch <- rep(1:schools, each = students * classes * teachers) 
     
    va_fpr <- vector() 
    va_fnr <- vector() 
    comp_fpr <- vector() 
    comp_fnr <- vector() 
    comp2_fnr <- vector() 
     
    for(i in 1:iters) { 
         
        f12 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12) 
        f13 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13) 
        f23 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23) 
         
        temp_mat <- matrix(nrow = 3, ncol = 3) 
        diag(temp_mat) <- c(pt, po_t, pt) 
        temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)] <- c(f12, f13, f23) 
        temp_mat[lower.tri(temp_mat)] <- temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)]  
         
        evals <- mvrnorm(teachers * schools, c(0,0,0), temp_mat) 
        e <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes * schools, sd = sqrt(pe)) 
        c <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(pc)) 
        t <- evals[,1] 
        s <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(ps)) 
        sse <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes * schools, sd = sqrt(pe)) 
        ssc <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(pc)) 
        sst <- evals[,3] 
        sss <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(ps)) 
        pot <- evals[,2] 
        pos <- rnorm(schools, sd = sqrt(po_s)) 
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        poc <- rnorm(classes * teachers * schools, sd = sqrt(po_c)) 
         
        school <- rep(s, each = teachers * classes * students) 
        teacher <- rep(t, each = classes * students) 
        class <- rep(c, each = students) 
        ssschool <- rep(sss, each = teachers * classes * students) 
        ssteacher <- rep(sst, each = classes * students) 
        ssclass <- rep(ssc, each = students) 
        poschool <- rep(pos, each = teachers * classes) 
        poteacher <- rep(pot, each = classes) 
         
        growth <- e + school + teacher + class 
        ssurvey <- sse + ssschool + ssteacher + ssclass 
        pobservation <- poschool + poteacher + poc 
         
        st_observed <- data.frame(growth = growth, ssurvey = ssurvey, pobservation = 
rep(pobservation, each = classes * students), 
                                  stu = as.factor(stu), cla = as.factor(cla), tea = 
as.factor(tea), sch = as.factor(sch)) 
        te_observed <- data.frame(pobservation = pobservation, cla = 
rep(as.factor(1:classes), times = teachers * schools),  
                                  tea = as.factor(rep(1:(teachers * schools), each = 
classes)),  
                                  sch = as.factor(rep(1:schools, each = teachers * 
classes))) 
         
        model1 <- lmer(growth ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea) + (1|sch), st_observed) 
        model2 <- lmer(ssurvey ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea) + (1|sch), st_observed) 
        model3 <- lmer(pobservation ~ (1|tea) + (1|sch), te_observed) 
         
        model1_vars <- se.extract(model1, po = FALSE) 
        model2_vars <- se.extract(model2, po = FALSE) 
        model3_vars <- se.extract(model3, po = TRUE) 
        comp_se <- sqrt(model1_vars$var_ols + model2_vars$var_ols + model3_vars$var_ols) 
# model based standard error of comp scores 
        comp_var <- 2 * pt + po_t + 2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12) + 2 * (sqrt(pt) * 
sqrt(pt) * r13) + 2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23) # variance of comp scores accounting 
for covariances 
         
        qva_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt) + sqrt(ps))) # sqrt(pt + ps) or sqrt(pt) + 
sqrt(ps), also, divide by 1? 
        qva_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt) + sqrt(ps))) + thresh)) 
        qcomp_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) 
        qcomp_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + thresh))  
        qcomp2_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + .18))  
         
        # Three schemes 
        va_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qva_fpr / model1_vars$se_ols)) 
        va_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qva_fnr / model1_vars$se_ols) 
         
        comp_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qcomp_fpr / comp_se)) 
        comp_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp_fnr / comp_se) 
        comp2_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp2_fnr / comp_se) 
         
    } 
     
    list(va_fpr = va_fpr, va_fnr = va_fnr, comp_fpr = comp_fpr, comp_fnr = comp_fnr, 
comp2_fnr = comp2_fnr) 
     
} 
 
diss_simwithin <- function(pe = .92, pt = .03, pc = .035, ps = .011, po_t = .90, po_c = 
.10, 
                           r12 = .5, r13  = .7, r23 = .5, 
                           alpha = .05, thresh = .275, 
                           students = 23, classes = 10, teachers = 10, 
                           iters = 1) { 
     
    # Pulls se and ols variance from lmer model 
    se.extract <- function(model, po) { 
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        if(po == FALSE) { 
            var_w <- VarCorr(model)[["cla"]][[1]] / (classes) 
            var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (students * classes) 
            #var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (((teachers) - 1) / (teachers)) 
            var_ols <- (var_w + var_e) * (teachers / (teachers - 1)) 
            se_ols <- sqrt(var_ols) 
        } 
         
        if(po == TRUE) { 
            var_e <- (attr(VarCorr(model), "sc") ^2) / (classes) 
            #var_ols <- var_e * (((teachers) - 1) / (teachers)) 
            var_ols <- (var_e) * (teachers / (teachers - 1)) 
            se_ols <- 0 
        } 
         
        list(var_ols = var_ols, se_ols = se_ols) 
    } 
     
    stu <- 1:(students * teachers * classes) 
    cla <- rep(1:(teachers * classes), each = students) 
    tea <- rep(1:(teachers), each = students * classes) 
     
    va_fpr <- vector() 
    va_fnr <- vector() 
    comp_fpr <- vector() 
    comp_fnr <- vector() 
    comp2_fnr <- vector() 
     
    for(i in 1:iters) { 
         
        f12 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12) 
        f13 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13) 
        f23 = (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23) 
         
        temp_mat <- matrix(nrow = 3, ncol = 3) 
        diag(temp_mat) <- c(pt, po_t, pt) 
        temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)] <- c(f12, f13, f23) 
        temp_mat[lower.tri(temp_mat)] <- temp_mat[upper.tri(temp_mat)]  
         
        evals <- mvrnorm(teachers, c(0,0,0), temp_mat) 
        e <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes, sd = sqrt(pe)) 
        c <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(pc)) 
        t <- evals[,1] 
        sse <- rnorm(students * teachers * classes, sd = sqrt(pe)) 
        ssc <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(pc)) 
        sst <- evals[,3] 
        pot <- evals[,2] 
        poc <- rnorm(classes * teachers, sd = sqrt(po_c)) 
         
        teacher <- rep(t, each = classes * students) 
        class <- rep(c, each = students) 
        ssteacher <- rep(sst, each = classes * students) 
        ssclass <- rep(ssc, each = students) 
        poteacher <- rep(pot, each = classes) 
         
        growth <- e + teacher + class 
        ssurvey <- sse + ssteacher + ssclass 
        pobservation <- poteacher + poc 
         
        st_observed <- data.frame(growth = growth, ssurvey = ssurvey, pobservation = 
rep(pobservation, each = classes * students), 
                                  stu = as.factor(stu), cla = as.factor(cla), tea = 
as.factor(tea)) 
        te_observed <- data.frame(pobservation = pobservation, cla = 
rep(as.factor(1:classes), times = teachers),  
                                  tea = as.factor(rep(1:(teachers), each = classes))) 
         
        model1 <- lmer(growth ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea), st_observed) 
        model2 <- lmer(ssurvey ~ (1|cla) + (1|tea), st_observed) 
        model3 <- lmer(pobservation ~ (1|tea), te_observed) 
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        model1_vars <- se.extract(model1, po = FALSE) 
        model2_vars <- se.extract(model2, po = FALSE) 
        model3_vars <- se.extract(model3, po = TRUE) 
        comp_se <- sqrt(model1_vars$var_ols + model2_vars$var_ols + model3_vars$var_ols) 
# model based standard error of comp scores 
        comp_var <- (2 * pt) + po_t + (2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r12)) + (2 * 
(sqrt(pt) * sqrt(pt) * r13)) + (2 * (sqrt(pt) * sqrt(po_t) * r23)) # variance of comp 
scores accounting for covariances 
         
        qva_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt)))  
        qva_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(pt))) + thresh)) 
        qcomp_fpr <- abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) 
        qcomp_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + thresh))  
        qcomp2_fnr <- (-1 * (abs(rnorm(1, sd = sqrt(comp_var))) + .18))  
         
        # Three schemes 
        va_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qva_fpr / model1_vars$se_ols)) 
        va_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qva_fnr / model1_vars$se_ols) 
        comp_fpr[i] <- 1 - pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + (qcomp_fpr / comp_se)) 
        comp_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp_fnr / comp_se) 
        comp2_fnr[i] <- pnorm(qnorm(1 - alpha) + qcomp2_fnr / comp_se) 
         
    } 
     
    list(va_fpr = va_fpr, va_fnr = va_fnr, comp_fpr = comp_fpr, comp_fnr = comp_fnr, 
comp2_fnr = comp2_fnr) 
     
} 
 
CONTROL FILE 
 
rm(list = ls()) 
setwd("C:\\School\\Papers\\Dissertation") 
source("C:\\School\\Papers\\Dissertation\\simulation.R") 
 
classes <- c(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) 
teachers <- c(4, 12) 
schools <- c(10, 50) 
 
r12 <- c(0, .37, .84) 
r13 <- c(0, .27, .62) 
r23 <- c(0, .59, .84) 
 
alpha <- c(.01, .05, .10) 
 
iters <- 1000 
 
# Header vector 
counter = 1 
headerb <- vector() 
for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
        for(c in 1:length(schools)) { 
            for(d in 1:length(r12)) { 
                for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                    headerb[counter] <- paste("a", a, "b", b, "c", c, "d", d, "e", e, sep 
= "") 
                    counter = counter + 1 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
counter = 1 
headerw <- vector() 
for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
        for(d in 1:length(r12)) { 
            for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
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                headerw[counter] <- paste("a", a, "b", b, "d", d, "e", e, sep = "") 
                counter = counter + 1 
            } 
        } 
         
    } 
} 
 
 
# Simulation between 
counter = 1 
matb_va_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerb)) 
matb_va_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerb)) 
matb_comp_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerb)) 
matb_comp_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerb)) 
matb_comp2_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerb), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerb)) 
for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
        for(c in 1:length(schools)) { 
            for(d in 1:length(r12)) { 
                for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                    va_fnr <- vector() 
                    va_fpr <- vector() 
                    comp_fnr <- vector() 
                    comp_fpr <- vector() 
                    comp2_fnr <- vector() 
                    for(f in 1:iters) { 
                        temp <- diss_simbetween(classes = classes[a], teachers = 
teachers[b], schools = schools[c],  
                                                r12 = r12[d], r13 = r13[d], r23 = r23[d], 
alpha = alpha[e]) 
                        va_fnr[f] <- temp$va_fnr 
                        va_fpr[f] <- temp$va_fpr 
                        comp_fnr[f] <- temp$comp_fnr 
                        comp_fpr[f] <- temp$comp_fpr 
                        comp2_fnr[f] <- temp$comp2_fnr 
                         
                        print(paste(paste("a", a, "b", b, "c", c, "d", d, "e", e, sep = 
""), f, "between"), sep = "    ") 
                    } 
                    matb_va_fnr[,counter] <- va_fnr 
                    matb_va_fpr[,counter] <- va_fpr 
                    matb_comp_fnr[,counter] <- comp_fnr 
                    matb_comp_fpr[,counter] <- comp_fpr 
                    matb_comp2_fnr[,counter] <- comp2_fnr 
                    counter = counter + 1 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
# Simulation within 
counter = 1 
matw_va_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerw)) 
matw_va_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerw)) 
matw_comp_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerw)) 
matw_comp_fpr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerw)) 
matw_comp2_fnr <- matrix(ncol = length(headerw), nrow = iters, dimnames = list(c(), 
headerw)) 
for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
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        for(d in 1:length(r12)) { 
            for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                va_fnr <- vector() 
                va_fpr <- vector() 
                comp_fnr <- vector() 
                comp_fpr <- vector() 
                comp2_fnr <- vector() 
                for(f in 1:iters) { 
                    temp <- diss_simwithin(classes = classes[a], teachers = teachers[b],  
                                           r12 = r12[d], r13 = r13[d], r23 = r23[d], 
alpha = alpha[e]) 
                    va_fnr[f] <- temp$va_fnr 
                    va_fpr[f] <- temp$va_fpr 
                    comp_fnr[f] <- temp$comp_fnr 
                    comp_fpr[f] <- temp$comp_fpr 
                    comp2_fnr[f] <- temp$comp2_fnr 
                     
                    print(paste(paste("a", a, "b", b, "d", d, "e", e, sep = ""), f, 
"with"), sep = "    ") 
                } 
                matw_va_fnr[,counter] <- va_fnr 
                matw_va_fpr[,counter] <- va_fpr 
                matw_comp_fnr[,counter] <- comp_fnr 
                matw_comp_fpr[,counter] <- comp_fpr 
                matw_comp2_fnr[,counter] <- comp2_fnr 
                counter = counter + 1 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
write.table(matb_va_fpr, file = "vab_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names = 
TRUE) 
write.table(matb_va_fnr, file = "vab_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names = 
TRUE) 
write.table(matb_comp_fpr, file = "compb_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
write.table(matb_comp_fnr, file = "compb_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
write.table(matb_comp2_fnr, file = "comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
write.table(matw_va_fpr, file = "vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names = 
TRUE) 
write.table(matw_va_fnr, file = "vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, col.names = 
TRUE) 
write.table(matw_comp_fpr, file = "compw_fpr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
write.table(matw_comp_fnr, file = "compw_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
write.table(matw_comp2_fnr, file = "comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ",", row.names = FALSE, 
col.names = TRUE) 
 
ANALYSIS FILE 
 
list(rm = ls()) 
setwd("C:/School/Papers/Dissertation/Simfiles") 
library(foreign) 
vab_fnr <- apply(read.csv("vab_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
vab_fpr <- apply(read.csv("vab_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
compb_fnr <- apply(read.csv("compb_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
compb_fpr <- apply(read.csv("compb_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, function(x) mean(x, na.rm = 
TRUE)) 
comp2b_fnr <- apply(read.csv("comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
vaw_fnr <- apply(read.csv("vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
vaw_fpr <- apply(read.csv("vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
compw_fnr <- apply(read.csv("compw_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
compw_fpr <- apply(read.csv("compw_fpr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
comp2w_fnr <- apply(read.csv("comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ","), 2, mean) 
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vab_fnr_inf <- read.csv("vab_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
vab_fpr_inf <- read.csv("vab_fpr.csv", sep = ",") 
compb_fnr_inf <- read.csv("compb_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
compb_fpr_inf <- read.csv("compb_fpr.csv", sep = ",") 
comp2b_fnr_inf <- read.csv("comp2b_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
vaw_fnr_inf <- read.csv("vaw_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
vaw_fpr_inf <- read.csv("vaw_fpr.csv", sep = ",") 
compw_fnr_inf <- read.csv("compw_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
compw_fpr_inf <- read.csv("compw_fpr.csv", sep = ",") 
comp2w_fnr_inf <- read.csv("comp2w_fnr.csv", sep = ",") 
 
pullb <- function(teachers, schools, cor, alpha, classes = 4, type = "combined", inf = 
FALSE) { 
     
    cycles = 1:classes 
    if(inf == FALSE) { 
         
        out_va <- vector() 
        out_comp <- vector() 
        out_comp2 <- vector() 
         
        for(i in 1:classes) { 
            search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", schools, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", cor, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", alpha, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")", 
                            sep = "") 
            if(type == "combined") { 
                out_va[i] <- vab_fnr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
vab_fpr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compb_fnr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp2[i] <- comp2b_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2b_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
            } else if(type == "negative") { 
                out_va[i] <- vab_fnr[grep(search, names(vab_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compb_fnr[grep(search, names(compb_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp2[i] <- comp2b_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2b_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
            } else if(type == "positive") { 
                out_va[i] <- vab_fpr[grep(search, names(vab_fpr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compb_fpr[grep(search, names(compb_fpr), perl= TRUE)] 
                comp2_mat <- out_comp 
            } 
        } 
        out_va <- smth(out_va) 
        out_comp <- smth(out_comp) 
        out_comp2 <- smth(out_comp2) 
        if(teachers == "b1") {tea = 4} else {tea = 12} 
        if(schools == "c1") {sch = 10} else {sch = 50} 
        if(cor == "d1") {cor = "low"} else if(cor == "d2") {cor = "medium"} else {cor = 
"high"} 
        if(alpha == "e1") {alpha = .01} else if(alpha == "e2") {alpha = .05} else {alpha 
= ".10"} 
        list(out_va = out_va, out_comp = out_comp, out_comp2 = out_comp2, tea = tea, sch 
= sch, cor = cor, alpha = alpha) 
    } else if(inf == TRUE) { 
        cols<- vector() 
        for(i in 1:classes) { 
            search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", schools, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", cor, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", alpha, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")", 
                            sep = "") 
            cols <- append(cols, grep(search, names(vab_fnr_inf), perl= TRUE)) 
        } 
        if(type == "combined") { 
            va_mat <- vab_fnr_inf[,cols] + vab_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compb_fnr_inf[,cols] + compb_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp2b_fnr_inf[,cols] + compb_fpr_inf[,cols] 
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        } else if(type == "negative") { 
            va_mat <- vab_fnr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compb_fnr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp2b_fnr_inf[,cols] 
        } else if(type == "positive") { 
            va_mat <- vab_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compb_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp_mat 
        } 
         
        list(out_va = va_mat, out_comp = comp_mat, out_comp2 = comp2_mat) 
    } 
} 
 
pullw <- function(teachers, cor, alpha, classes = 4, type = "combined", inf = FALSE) { 
     
    cycles = 1:classes 
    if(inf == FALSE) { 
         
        out_va <- vector() 
        out_comp <- vector() 
        out_comp2 <- vector() 
         
        for(i in 1:classes) { 
            search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", cor, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", alpha, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")", 
                            sep = "") 
            if(type == "combined") { 
                out_va[i] <- vaw_fnr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
vaw_fpr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compw_fnr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp2[i] <- comp2w_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2w_fnr), perl= TRUE)] + 
compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
            } else if(type == "negative") { 
                out_va[i] <- vaw_fnr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compw_fnr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp2[i] <- comp2w_fnr[grep(search, names(comp2w_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
            } else if(type == "positive") { 
                out_va[i] <- vaw_fpr[grep(search, names(vaw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                out_comp[i] <- compw_fpr[grep(search, names(compw_fnr), perl= TRUE)] 
                comp2_mat <- out_comp 
            } 
        } 
        out_va <- smth(out_va) 
        out_comp <- smth(out_comp) 
        out_comp2 <- smth(out_comp2) 
        if(teachers == "b1") {tea = 4} else {tea = 12} 
        if(cor == "d1") {cor = "low"} else if(cor == "d2") {cor = "medium"} else {cor = 
"high"} 
        if(alpha == "e1") {alpha = .01} else if(alpha == "e2") {alpha = .05} else {alpha 
= ".10"} 
        list(out_va = out_va, out_comp = out_comp, out_comp2 = out_comp2, tea = tea, cor 
= cor, alpha = alpha) 
    } else { 
        cols <- vector() 
        for(i in 1:classes) { 
            search <- paste("(?=.*", teachers, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", cor, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", alpha, ")",  
                            "(?=.*", paste("a", cycles[i], sep = ""),")", 
                            sep = "") 
            cols <- append(cols, grep(search, names(vaw_fnr_inf), perl= TRUE)) 
        } 
         
        if(type == "combined") { 
            va_mat <- vaw_fnr_inf[,cols] + vaw_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compw_fnr_inf[,cols] + compw_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp2w_fnr_inf[,cols] + compw_fpr_inf[,cols] 
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        } else if(type == "negative") { 
            va_mat <- vaw_fnr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compw_fnr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp2w_fnr_inf[,cols] 
        } else if(type == "positive") { 
            va_mat <- vaw_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp_mat <- compw_fpr_inf[,cols] 
            comp2_mat <- comp_mat 
        } 
         
        list(out_va = va_mat, out_comp = comp_mat, out_comp2 = comp2_mat) 
    } 
} 
 
plot_funb <- function(pull) { 
    plot(c(3:9), pull[[1]], type = "l", lwd = 2, lty = 1, ylab = "", xlab = "", 
         ylim = c(.05, .65)) 
    mtext(paste("teachers = ", pull$tea, "  ", "schools = ", pull$sch, "  ", "cor = ", 
pull$cor, "  ", "alpha = ", pull$alpha, "  ",  sep = ""),cex = .70) 
    lines(pull[[2]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, lty = 2) 
    #lines(pull[[3]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, col = "blue") 
     
    legend("topright", lty = c(1,2), legend = c("VA", "Composite")) 
     
} 
 
plot_funw <- function(pull) { 
    plot(c(3:9), pull[[1]], type = "l", lwd = 2, lty = 1, ylab = "", xlab = "", 
         ylim = c(.05, .65)) 
    mtext(paste("teachers = ", pull$tea, "  ", "cor = ", pull$cor, "  ", "alpha = ", 
pull$alpha, "  ", sep = ""),cex = .70) 
    lines(pull[[2]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, lty = 2) 
    #lines(pull[[3]] ~ c(3:9), lwd = 2, col = "blue") 
     
    legend("topright", lty = c(1, 2), legend = c("VA", "Composite")) 
     
} 
 
smth <- function(out) { 
    second <- mean(c(out[1], out[2])) 
    fourth <- mean(c(out[2], out[3])) 
    sixth <- mean(c(out[3], out[4])) 
    out <- c(out[1], second, out[2], fourth, out[3], sixth, out[4]) 
    out 
} 
 
plot_fun <- function() { 
    pdf("between.pdf") 
    teachers = c("b1", "b2") 
    schools = c("c1", "c2") 
    cor = c("d1", "d2", "d3") 
    alpha = c("e1", "e2", "e3") 
    par(mfrow = c(2,2)) 
    par(mar = c(3,3,2,2)) 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)){ 
        for(c in 1:length(schools)){ 
            for(d in 1:length(cor)){ 
                for(e in 1:length(alpha)){ 
                    pull <- pullb(teachers = teachers[b], schools = schools[c], cor = 
cor[d], alpha = alpha[e]) 
                    plot_funb(pull) 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    dev.off() 
     
    pdf("within.pdf") 
    par(mfrow = c(2,2)) 
    par(mar = c(3,3,2,2)) 
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)){ 
157 
 
 
 
        for(d in 1:length(cor)){ 
            for(e in 1:length(alpha)){ 
                pull <- pullw(teachers = teachers[b], cor = cor[d], alpha = alpha[e]) 
                plot_funw(pull) 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    dev.off() 
     
} 
 
plot_pub <- function() { 
    teachers = c("b1", "b2") 
    schools = c("c1", "c2") 
    cor = c("d1", "d2", "d3") 
    alpha = c("e1", "e2", "e3") 
    setwd("plots") 
    bet <- list() 
    wit <- list() 
    counterb = 1 
    counterw = 1 
     
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)){ 
        for(c in 1:length(schools)){ 
            for(d in 1:length(cor)){ 
                for(e in 1:length(alpha)){ 
                    bet[[counterb]] <- pullb(teachers = teachers[b], schools = 
schools[c], cor = cor[d], alpha = alpha[e]) 
                    counterb = counterb + 1 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    for(b in 1:length(teachers)){ 
        for(d in 1:length(cor)){ 
            for(e in 1:length(alpha)){ 
                for(f in 1:4) { 
                    wit[[counterw]] <- pullw(teachers = teachers[b], cor = cor[d], alpha 
= alpha[e]) 
                    counterw = counterw + 1 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
     
  
} 
 
 
table_funb <- function(classes = 3:9, teachers = c(4, 12), schools = c(10, 50), 
correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"),  
                       alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), type = "combined") { 
    tea <- vector() 
    cla <- vector() 
    sch <- vector() 
    cor <- vector() 
    alp <- vector() 
    counter = 1 
    for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
        for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
            for(c in 1:length(schools)) { 
                for(d in 1:length(correlation)) { 
                    for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                        cla[counter] <- classes[a] 
                        tea[counter] <- teachers[b] 
                        sch[counter] <- schools[c] 
                        cor[counter] <- correlation[d] 
                        alp[counter] <- alpha[e] 
                        counter = counter + 1 
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                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    out_va <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, sch = sch, cor = cor, alp = alp), 
row.vars = c(1,2,4)) 
    out_comp <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, sch = sch, cor = cor, alp = alp), 
row.vars = c(1,2,4)) 
    attr(out_va, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation 
    attr(out_comp, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation 
     
    options(stringsAsFactors = FALSE) 
    frame_classes <- data.frame(classes = 3:9, codes = 1:7) 
    frame_teachers <- data.frame(teachers = c(4,12), codes = c("b1", "b2")) 
    frame_schools <- data.frame(schools = c(10,50), codes = c("c1", "c2")) 
    frame_correlation <- data.frame(correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"), codes = 
c("d1", "d2", "d3")) 
    frame_alpha <- data.frame(alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), codes = c("e1", "e2", 
"e3")) 
    options(stringsAsFactors = TRUE) 
 
    classes <- frame_classes$codes[frame_classes$classes %in% classes] 
    teachers <- frame_teachers$codes[frame_teachers$teachers %in% teachers]     
    schools <- frame_schools$codes[frame_schools$schools %in% schools]   
    correlation <- frame_correlation$codes[frame_correlation$correlation %in% 
correlation]   
    alpha <- frame_alpha$codes[frame_alpha$alpha %in% alpha]   
     
    counter = 1 
    for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
        for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
            for(c in 1:length(correlation)) { 
                line_va <- vector() 
                line_comp <- vector() 
                for(d in 1:length(schools)) { 
                    temp_va <- vector() 
                    temp_comp <- vector() 
                    for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                        save <- pullb(teachers[b], schools[d], correlation[c], alpha[e], 
type = type) 
                        temp_va[e] <- save$out_va[classes[a]] 
                        temp_comp[e] <- save$out_comp[classes[a]] 
                    } 
                    line_va <- c(line_va,temp_va) 
                    line_comp <- c(line_comp,temp_comp) 
                } 
                out_va[counter,] <- line_va 
                out_comp[counter,] <- line_comp 
                counter = counter + 1 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    list(table_va = out_va, table_comp = out_comp) 
} 
 
table_funw <- function(classes = 3:9, teachers = c(4, 12), correlation = c("Low", "Mid", 
"High"), alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), type = "combined") { 
    tea <- vector() 
    cla <- vector() 
    sch <- vector() 
    cor <- vector() 
    alp <- vector() 
    counter = 1 
    for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
        for(b in 1:length(teachers)) { 
            for(d in 1:length(correlation)) { 
                for(e in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                    cla[counter] <- classes[a] 
                    tea[counter] <- teachers[b] 
                    cor[counter] <- correlation[d] 
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                    alp[counter] <- alpha[e] 
                    counter = counter + 1 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    out_va <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, cor = cor, alp = alp), row.vars = 
c(1,3)) 
    out_comp <- ftable(data.frame(cla = cla, tea = tea, cor = cor, alp = alp), row.vars = 
c(1,3)) 
    attr(out_va, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation 
    attr(out_comp, "row.vars")$cor <- correlation 
     
    options(stringsAsFactors = FALSE) 
    frame_classes <- data.frame(classes = 3:9, codes = 1:7) 
    frame_teachers <- data.frame(teachers = c(4,12), codes = c("b1", "b2")) 
    frame_correlation <- data.frame(correlation = c("Low", "Mid", "High"), codes = 
c("d1", "d2", "d3")) 
    frame_alpha <- data.frame(alpha = c(".01", ".05", ".10"), codes = c("e1", "e2", 
"e3")) 
    options(stringsAsFactors = TRUE) 
     
    classes <- frame_classes$codes[frame_classes$classes %in% classes] 
    teachers <- frame_teachers$codes[frame_teachers$teachers %in% teachers]     
    correlation <- frame_correlation$codes[frame_correlation$correlation %in% 
correlation]   
    alpha <- frame_alpha$codes[frame_alpha$alpha %in% alpha]  
     
    counter = 1 
    for(a in 1:length(classes)) { 
        for(b in 1:length(correlation)) { 
            line_va <- vector() 
            line_comp <- vector() 
            for(c in 1:length(teachers)) { 
                temp_va <- vector() 
                temp_comp <- vector() 
                for(d in 1:length(alpha)) { 
                    save <- pullw(teachers[c], correlation[b], alpha[d], type = type) 
                    temp_va[d] <- save$out_va[classes[a]] 
                    temp_comp[d] <- save$out_comp[classes[a]] 
                } 
                line_va <- c(line_va, temp_va) 
                line_comp <- c(line_comp, temp_comp) 
            } 
            out_va[counter,] <- line_va 
            out_comp[counter,] <- line_comp 
            counter = counter + 1 
        } 
    } 
     
    list(table_va = out_va, table_comp = out_comp) 
} 
